{"title":"电子市场的组织:新制度经济学的贡献","authors":"A. Picot, Christine Bortenlanger, H. Rohrl","doi":"10.1080/019722497129313","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Electronic markets are increasingly gaining scientific and economic attention. In order to realize their often postulated rationalization potential, a closer look into their organization is necessary. New institutional economics provides a body of theory well suited for this task. Transaction cost theory helps to understand why transactions are more often conducted via markets and why those markets require organization. Principal-agent theory explains future (dis-)intermediation structures in electronic markets. Finally, property rights theory helps to understand why a certain level of market intransparency will remain in electronic markets.","PeriodicalId":259468,"journal":{"name":"Inf. Soc.","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1997-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"74","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Organization of Electronic Markets: Contributions from the New Institutional Economics\",\"authors\":\"A. Picot, Christine Bortenlanger, H. Rohrl\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/019722497129313\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Electronic markets are increasingly gaining scientific and economic attention. In order to realize their often postulated rationalization potential, a closer look into their organization is necessary. New institutional economics provides a body of theory well suited for this task. Transaction cost theory helps to understand why transactions are more often conducted via markets and why those markets require organization. Principal-agent theory explains future (dis-)intermediation structures in electronic markets. Finally, property rights theory helps to understand why a certain level of market intransparency will remain in electronic markets.\",\"PeriodicalId\":259468,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Inf. Soc.\",\"volume\":\"16 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1997-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"74\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Inf. Soc.\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/019722497129313\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Inf. Soc.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/019722497129313","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Organization of Electronic Markets: Contributions from the New Institutional Economics
Electronic markets are increasingly gaining scientific and economic attention. In order to realize their often postulated rationalization potential, a closer look into their organization is necessary. New institutional economics provides a body of theory well suited for this task. Transaction cost theory helps to understand why transactions are more often conducted via markets and why those markets require organization. Principal-agent theory explains future (dis-)intermediation structures in electronic markets. Finally, property rights theory helps to understand why a certain level of market intransparency will remain in electronic markets.