Substituted Compliance: An Alternative to National Treatment for Cross-Border Transactions and International Financial Entities

The recent trend toward globalization of financial markets has resulted in a growing need for effective U.S. policies with respect to foreign banking organizations that conduct business with U.S. persons or within U.S. territory. These foreign financial entities typically fall within the jurisdiction of both the U.S. and their home countries. Due to concerns that excessively risky activities of foreign entities could adversely affect U.S. markets, the Dodd-Frank Act defaults toward the National Treatment Model, mandating that all foreign entities within U.S. jurisdiction comply with U.S. regulations in addition to their home country regulations. However, the Dodd-Frank approach creates problems due to variations in financial regulations among jurisdictions — U.S. regulations are often redundant or in conflict with the entities’ host country rules. This article therefore recommends that U.S. agencies develop a policy that would: permit efficient transactions with jurisdictions that previously had conflicting regulations; reduce costs associated with complying with duplicative regulations; and minimize the risk of contagion to U.S. markets.This article will evaluate several potential regulatory frameworks for international entities — specifically harmonization, minilateralism, mutual recognition, and outcome-based substituted compliance — in the areas of entity registration; prudential standards, such as capital adequacy and liquidity; and transaction requirements, such as margin. Substituted compliance is a policy in which international financial institutions with operations in the U.S. could be deemed in compliance with U.S. law and regulations by complying with their host countries’ regulations, provided that the regulations in the host country are declared to be "equivalent" to their U.S. counterparts. If correctly implemented, substituted compliance could be the most effective framework for achieving the desired policy objectives in the areas of entity registration and over-the-counter derivative transactions. However, despite the benefits of substituted compliance, this article recognizes the lack of viability of substituted compliance with respect to prudential requirements until U.S. regulators have increased confidence in foreign regulators’ abilities to control contagion. This article suggests potential reforms that could provide such confidence.