{"title":"市场结构与行为:寡头垄断市场的广义行业绩效梯度指数","authors":"Kazuharu Kiyono","doi":"10.11398/ECONOMICS1986.44.242","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper generalizes Dansby-Willig's industry performance gradient index so as to explicitly relate the maximal feasible welfare improvement rate in imperfectly competitive markets with the number of firms perceiving market power and the industry-wide distribu tionof marginal costs. Two specific examples of the proposed generalized index are fully explored to obtain two results: (i) the greater number of oligopolistically behaving firms lowers but (ii) the greater variance of the marginal-cost distribution over the industry increases the maximal feasible rate of welfare improvement.","PeriodicalId":271985,"journal":{"name":"The Economic studies quarterly","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1993-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"MARKET STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT: GENERALIZED INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE GRADIENT INDEXES FOR OLIGOPOLY MARKETS\",\"authors\":\"Kazuharu Kiyono\",\"doi\":\"10.11398/ECONOMICS1986.44.242\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper generalizes Dansby-Willig's industry performance gradient index so as to explicitly relate the maximal feasible welfare improvement rate in imperfectly competitive markets with the number of firms perceiving market power and the industry-wide distribu tionof marginal costs. Two specific examples of the proposed generalized index are fully explored to obtain two results: (i) the greater number of oligopolistically behaving firms lowers but (ii) the greater variance of the marginal-cost distribution over the industry increases the maximal feasible rate of welfare improvement.\",\"PeriodicalId\":271985,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Economic studies quarterly\",\"volume\":\"3 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1993-09-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Economic studies quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.11398/ECONOMICS1986.44.242\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Economic studies quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.11398/ECONOMICS1986.44.242","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
MARKET STRUCTURE AND CONDUCT: GENERALIZED INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE GRADIENT INDEXES FOR OLIGOPOLY MARKETS
This paper generalizes Dansby-Willig's industry performance gradient index so as to explicitly relate the maximal feasible welfare improvement rate in imperfectly competitive markets with the number of firms perceiving market power and the industry-wide distribu tionof marginal costs. Two specific examples of the proposed generalized index are fully explored to obtain two results: (i) the greater number of oligopolistically behaving firms lowers but (ii) the greater variance of the marginal-cost distribution over the industry increases the maximal feasible rate of welfare improvement.