排挤美国

Adam Cox, Cristina M. Rodríguez
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章考虑联邦制如何在移民执法中发挥重要作用,并挑战两党总统,从而帮助构建关于移民在美国社会中的地位的全国性辩论。事实证明,州和地方官员的合作对找到和驱逐违反移民法的人的项目至关重要。今天,地方官员作为联邦政府的正式和非正式合作伙伴,作为信息和官僚专业知识的来源,并为联邦执法工作提供必要的人员。将联邦和州官员整合到一个单一的移民执法机构中,扩大了总统对移民法的权力,并使其复杂化。特别是当移民联邦制出现党派倾向时,总统就会有强大的动机去拉拢、压制或以其他方式控制地方倡议,以便将移民政策推向政府喜欢的方向。奥巴马和特朗普时代都是这种集中化趋势的生动例子。然而,在这种情况下,总统巩固权力的努力从未完成。由于行政部门无法摆脱对地方机构的官僚主义依赖,无论总统政府喜欢与否,将有意义的权力委托给非联邦官员仍然是体制的一部分。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Sidelining the States
This chapter considers how federalism has played an important role in immigration enforcement and challenged presidents of both parties, thus helping to structure national debates over the place of immigrants in American society. The cooperation of state and local officials turns out to be critical to the project of locating and deporting immigration violators. Today, local officials work as formal and informal partners to the federal government, serve as sources of information and bureaucratic expertise, and provide personnel essential to federal enforcement efforts. The integration of federal and state officials into a single immigration enforcement bureaucracy has expanded and complicated the President’s power over immigration law. Particularly when immigration federalism has taken a partisan turn, powerful incentives have arisen for the President to co-opt, crush, or otherwise control local initiatives in order to push immigration policy in the administration’s preferred direction. Both the Obama and Trump eras provide vivid examples of this centralizing tendency. Presidential efforts to consolidate power in these circumstances has never been complete, however. Because the Executive Branch cannot escape its bureaucratic reliance on local institutions, the delegation of meaningful power to nonfederal officials remains part of the system whether presidential administrations like it or not.
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