线性传声器电缆的灵敏度变化

G. Leach, M. Horner
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引用次数: 9

摘要

在许多外围入侵检测系统(pid)中,线性传声器电缆被用作传感器。这些电缆将振动能量转化为电能,然后对其进行分析以检测入侵企图。通常,电缆连接在围栏上,以感知通过切割或爬过围栏织物产生的振动。本文不涉及传声器电缆埋在地下的应用。传声器电缆的均匀响应是很重要的。电缆制造商经常强调其电缆响应的线性度(根据电缆长度的变化)。任何灵敏度高于平均水平的区域都会导致误报的倾向。相反,任何低于平均敏感度的延伸都更容易被打败。虽然电缆制造商说他们的产品沿其长度是线性的,但一旦电缆连接到焊接网围栏并测试响应,就会发现一些异常,意想不到的结果。如果使用“标准”撞击装置,在完全相同的地方重复进行物理撞击,那么产生的电反应似乎只有5%左右的变化。这意味着标准冲击装置是可重复的。然而,如果沿着一个区域测试响应,那么变化就大得多。在某种程度上,当所有类型的麦克风电缆都连接到围栏上时,这种变化一直是可见的。变奏是本文的主题。这种变化似乎是相对随机的,在相邻的栅栏间的反应中只有很小的相关性。尽管攻击者似乎不太可能利用这种变化,但它似乎仍然会导致难以从系统获得最佳性能。如果这种变化可以消除,那么可能会消除一些由过度敏感的海湾引起的假警报,并且可以捕获一些在海湾中错过的检测,这些海湾是不敏感的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Sensitivity variations in linear microphonic cables
Linear microphonic cables are used as the sensor for many Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems (PIDS). These cables transform vibrational energy into electrical energy which is then analysed to detect an intrusion attempt. Usually the cables are attached to a fence to sense the vibrations generated by cutting through or climbing over the fence fabric. This paper will not refer to the application where microphonic cables are buried in the ground. It is important that the response from microphonic cables is uniform. Manufacturers of cables often stress the linearity of response of their cables (in terms of variation along the cable's length.) Any areas of above-average sensitivity will lead to a propensity to false alarms. Conversely, any stretches which have below-average sensitivity will be more susceptible to being defeated. Although cable manufacturers say that their products are linear along their length, some anomalous, unexpected results are found once the cable is attached to a welded-mesh fence and the response is tested. If physical impacts are made repeatedly, in exactly the same place, using a "standard" impact device, then the electrical response generated seems to vary at that point by only around 5%. This implies that the standard impact device is reasonably repeatable. However, if the response is tested along a zone then the variation is much greater. This variation has always been seen, to some degree, when microphonic cables, of all types, are attached to fences. The variation is the subject of the paper. The variation seems to be relatively random, with only a little correlation in the response between adjacent fence bays. Although it seems unlikely that an attacker would be able to take advantage of the variation, it seems that it will still lead to difficulties in obtaining optimum performance from the system. If the variation could be eliminated then presumably some false alarms caused by the bays that are oversensitive could be eliminated, and some of the missed detections in the bays, that are under-sensitive could be captured.
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