A. Herzberg, Y. Mass, Joris Mihaeli, D. Naor, Yiftach Ravid
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Access control meets public key infrastructure, or: assigning roles to strangers
The Internet enables connectivity between many strangers: entities that don't know each other. We present the Trust Policy Language (TPL), used to define the mapping of strangers to predefined business roles, based on certificates issued by third parties. TPL is expressive enough to allow complex policies, e.g. non-monotone (negative) certificates, while being simple enough to allow automated policy checking and processing. Issuers of certificates are either known in advance, or provide sufficient certificates to be considered a trusted authority according to the policy. This allows bottom-up, "grass roots" buildup of trust, as in the real world. We extend, rather than replace, existing role based access control mechanisms. This provides a simple, modular architecture and easy migration from existing systems. Our system automatically collects missing certificates from peer servers. In particular this allows use of standard browsers, which pass only one certificate to the server. We describe our implementation, which can be used as an extension of a Web server or as a separate server with interface to applications.