{"title":"经济理论概念","authors":"Henry Tulkens","doi":"10.1142/9789813141230_0003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The following sections are included:The purpose and the messageEquilibriaAlternative individual country behaviors“Business as usual” (BAU) behaviorIndividual environmentally nationalistic behaviorStandard economic properties of an individual environmentally nationalistic equilibriumOther general properties of an individual environmentally nationalistic equilibriumInternational equilibriaThe “Business as usual” international equilibriumThe international environmentally nationalistic equilibriumStandard economic properties of an international environmentally nationalistic equilibriumOther general properties of an environmentally nationalistic international equilibriumEquilibria and the right to polluteEfficiencyInternational efficiencyEconomic properties of an efficient stateOther general properties of an efficient stateMultiple efficient statesEfficiency and the right to polluteThe issue of equityThe rationale for cooperationInefficiency and environmental abuse of equilibria with externalitiesThe ecological surplus to be sharedModalities of cooperationWho owns the right to pollute internationally?The assignment of rights issueRights are wealthRights vs. responsibilityTreaties as contractsThe likely outcomeThe processObstacles to cooperationThe informational problemsThe value of “environmental” goodsThe extreme difficulty of measurementWillingness to payWTP for what?Informational free ridingNon-participatory free ridingConcluding summary and problems left openAnnex: Analytical formulation of the one polluter (r)–one pollutee (e) reference model","PeriodicalId":124538,"journal":{"name":"Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements","volume":"136 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"ECONOMIC THEORY CONCEPTS\",\"authors\":\"Henry Tulkens\",\"doi\":\"10.1142/9789813141230_0003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The following sections are included:The purpose and the messageEquilibriaAlternative individual country behaviors“Business as usual” (BAU) behaviorIndividual environmentally nationalistic behaviorStandard economic properties of an individual environmentally nationalistic equilibriumOther general properties of an individual environmentally nationalistic equilibriumInternational equilibriaThe “Business as usual” international equilibriumThe international environmentally nationalistic equilibriumStandard economic properties of an international environmentally nationalistic equilibriumOther general properties of an environmentally nationalistic international equilibriumEquilibria and the right to polluteEfficiencyInternational efficiencyEconomic properties of an efficient stateOther general properties of an efficient stateMultiple efficient statesEfficiency and the right to polluteThe issue of equityThe rationale for cooperationInefficiency and environmental abuse of equilibria with externalitiesThe ecological surplus to be sharedModalities of cooperationWho owns the right to pollute internationally?The assignment of rights issueRights are wealthRights vs. responsibilityTreaties as contractsThe likely outcomeThe processObstacles to cooperationThe informational problemsThe value of “environmental” goodsThe extreme difficulty of measurementWillingness to payWTP for what?Informational free ridingNon-participatory free ridingConcluding summary and problems left openAnnex: Analytical formulation of the one polluter (r)–one pollutee (e) reference model\",\"PeriodicalId\":124538,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements\",\"volume\":\"136 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813141230_0003\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/9789813141230_0003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The following sections are included:The purpose and the messageEquilibriaAlternative individual country behaviors“Business as usual” (BAU) behaviorIndividual environmentally nationalistic behaviorStandard economic properties of an individual environmentally nationalistic equilibriumOther general properties of an individual environmentally nationalistic equilibriumInternational equilibriaThe “Business as usual” international equilibriumThe international environmentally nationalistic equilibriumStandard economic properties of an international environmentally nationalistic equilibriumOther general properties of an environmentally nationalistic international equilibriumEquilibria and the right to polluteEfficiencyInternational efficiencyEconomic properties of an efficient stateOther general properties of an efficient stateMultiple efficient statesEfficiency and the right to polluteThe issue of equityThe rationale for cooperationInefficiency and environmental abuse of equilibria with externalitiesThe ecological surplus to be sharedModalities of cooperationWho owns the right to pollute internationally?The assignment of rights issueRights are wealthRights vs. responsibilityTreaties as contractsThe likely outcomeThe processObstacles to cooperationThe informational problemsThe value of “environmental” goodsThe extreme difficulty of measurementWillingness to payWTP for what?Informational free ridingNon-participatory free ridingConcluding summary and problems left openAnnex: Analytical formulation of the one polluter (r)–one pollutee (e) reference model
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