Acting Under Duress

The plea that one acted under duress can alter completely the reaction to one's behaviour. Suppose, for example, that a cashier had given all the money in her register to a total stranger. If she could show that he had demanded the cash at gunpoint, she would change from an object of criticism to one of sympathy. Or imagine instead a witness who had committed perjury. If he turned out to have done so in response to dire threats from the defendant's fellow-gangsters, perhaps we should not be as entirely forgiving and sympathetic as we are with the cashier who faced the robber. But we should not be as hard on him as we should if he had lied for money, or for fun. In other circumstances the plea that one acted under duress would fail entirely, neither eliminating nor mitigating criticism. Not every threat impresses us, and some impress us more than others. What ought to make these differences? And can only a threat put someone under duress, or could an offer do so: say, an offer of something very badly needed? And what are we to say about mixed motivation: for example, about a cashier who handed over the money partly in order to avoid being shot, but also partly in hopes of bankrupting her detested employer? These questions are connected, and call for a general account of duress. I will review two such accounts, then offer a third.