{"title":"管理层自由裁量权对CEO薪酬绩效敏感性影响的实证研究","authors":"Changzheng Zhang, Jie Xie","doi":"10.1109/ICRMEM.2008.23","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Literatures have discussed the effect of many variables, such as firm size, firm risk and industry features etc., on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. However, it is indicated that the fact of persistent low CEO pay-performance sensitivity is still not explained effectively. From the perspective of internal governance structure, the paper takes managerial discretion, a variable most comprehensively reflecting corporate governance quality, as the critical influencing variable, and focuses on its effect on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Based on the literature review and theoretical analysis, a hypothesis holding that managerial discretion can manipulate CEO pay-performance sensitivity negatively and significantly is proposed. Finally, by applying the data of 784 Chinese listed firms both of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2004, the paper empirically proves that managerial discretion can negatively manipulate CEO pay-performance sensitivity significantly and high managerial discretion without effective monitoring is the critical factor of persistent low CEO pay-performance sensitivity.","PeriodicalId":430801,"journal":{"name":"2008 International Conference on Risk Management & Engineering Management","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Empirical Study on Effect of Managerial Discretion on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity\",\"authors\":\"Changzheng Zhang, Jie Xie\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICRMEM.2008.23\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Literatures have discussed the effect of many variables, such as firm size, firm risk and industry features etc., on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. However, it is indicated that the fact of persistent low CEO pay-performance sensitivity is still not explained effectively. From the perspective of internal governance structure, the paper takes managerial discretion, a variable most comprehensively reflecting corporate governance quality, as the critical influencing variable, and focuses on its effect on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Based on the literature review and theoretical analysis, a hypothesis holding that managerial discretion can manipulate CEO pay-performance sensitivity negatively and significantly is proposed. Finally, by applying the data of 784 Chinese listed firms both of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2004, the paper empirically proves that managerial discretion can negatively manipulate CEO pay-performance sensitivity significantly and high managerial discretion without effective monitoring is the critical factor of persistent low CEO pay-performance sensitivity.\",\"PeriodicalId\":430801,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2008 International Conference on Risk Management & Engineering Management\",\"volume\":\"17 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-11-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2008 International Conference on Risk Management & Engineering Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICRMEM.2008.23\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2008 International Conference on Risk Management & Engineering Management","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICRMEM.2008.23","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Empirical Study on Effect of Managerial Discretion on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity
Literatures have discussed the effect of many variables, such as firm size, firm risk and industry features etc., on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. However, it is indicated that the fact of persistent low CEO pay-performance sensitivity is still not explained effectively. From the perspective of internal governance structure, the paper takes managerial discretion, a variable most comprehensively reflecting corporate governance quality, as the critical influencing variable, and focuses on its effect on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Based on the literature review and theoretical analysis, a hypothesis holding that managerial discretion can manipulate CEO pay-performance sensitivity negatively and significantly is proposed. Finally, by applying the data of 784 Chinese listed firms both of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2004, the paper empirically proves that managerial discretion can negatively manipulate CEO pay-performance sensitivity significantly and high managerial discretion without effective monitoring is the critical factor of persistent low CEO pay-performance sensitivity.