公司治理对金融分析师重要吗?来自突尼斯的证据

Imen Fredj, M. Rabah Gana
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文考察了突尼斯证券交易所公司治理机制与分析师预测准确性和建议之间的联系。基于代理和信号理论,善治机制旨在缓解代理冲突,提高公司透明度。因此,它们可以在预测过程中起到中介作用。使用357个公司年度观察样本,治理质量、目标价格准确性和建议之间分别存在显著关系。最重要的结果之一是,首席执行官薪酬是分析师在制定预测时可以依赖的有效机制,尤其是在金融领域。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does Corporate Governance Matter for Financial Analysts? Evidence from Tunisia
This article examines the link between corporate governance mechanisms with both analyst forecasts accuracy and recommendations within the Tunisian Stock Exchange. Based on agency and signaling theories, good governance mechanisms aim to mitigate agency conflicts, and improve corporate transparency. As a result, they can serve as mediators in the forecasting process. Using a sample of 357 firm-year observations, there is a significant relation between governance quality, target price accuracy and recommendations, respectively. One of the most important results is that CEO compensation is an effective mechanism on which analysts can rely when setting their forecasts, especially within the financial sector.
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