{"title":"通过跨层集成信息来检测数据泄露","authors":"Puneet Sharma, A. Joshi, Timothy W. Finin","doi":"10.1109/IRI.2013.6642487","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Data exfiltration is the unauthorized leakage of confidential data from a system. Unlike intrusions that seek to overtly disable or damage a system, it is particularly hard to detect because it uses a variety of low/slow vectors and advanced persistent threats (APTs). It is often assisted (intentionally or not) by an insider who might be an employee who downloads a trojan or uses a hardware component that has been tampered with or acquired from an unreliable source. Conventional scan and test based detection approaches work poorly, especially for hardware with embedded trojans. We describe a framework to detect potential exfiltration events that actively monitors of a set of key parameters that cover the entire stack, from hardware to the application layer. An attack alert is generated only if several monitors detect suspicious activity within a short temporal window. The cross-layer monitoring and integration helps ensure accurate alerts with fewer false positives and makes designing a successful attack more difficult.","PeriodicalId":418492,"journal":{"name":"2013 IEEE 14th International Conference on Information Reuse & Integration (IRI)","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Detecting data exfiltration by integrating information across layers\",\"authors\":\"Puneet Sharma, A. Joshi, Timothy W. Finin\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/IRI.2013.6642487\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Data exfiltration is the unauthorized leakage of confidential data from a system. Unlike intrusions that seek to overtly disable or damage a system, it is particularly hard to detect because it uses a variety of low/slow vectors and advanced persistent threats (APTs). It is often assisted (intentionally or not) by an insider who might be an employee who downloads a trojan or uses a hardware component that has been tampered with or acquired from an unreliable source. Conventional scan and test based detection approaches work poorly, especially for hardware with embedded trojans. We describe a framework to detect potential exfiltration events that actively monitors of a set of key parameters that cover the entire stack, from hardware to the application layer. An attack alert is generated only if several monitors detect suspicious activity within a short temporal window. The cross-layer monitoring and integration helps ensure accurate alerts with fewer false positives and makes designing a successful attack more difficult.\",\"PeriodicalId\":418492,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2013 IEEE 14th International Conference on Information Reuse & Integration (IRI)\",\"volume\":\"55 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-10-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2013 IEEE 14th International Conference on Information Reuse & Integration (IRI)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/IRI.2013.6642487\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2013 IEEE 14th International Conference on Information Reuse & Integration (IRI)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/IRI.2013.6642487","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Detecting data exfiltration by integrating information across layers
Data exfiltration is the unauthorized leakage of confidential data from a system. Unlike intrusions that seek to overtly disable or damage a system, it is particularly hard to detect because it uses a variety of low/slow vectors and advanced persistent threats (APTs). It is often assisted (intentionally or not) by an insider who might be an employee who downloads a trojan or uses a hardware component that has been tampered with or acquired from an unreliable source. Conventional scan and test based detection approaches work poorly, especially for hardware with embedded trojans. We describe a framework to detect potential exfiltration events that actively monitors of a set of key parameters that cover the entire stack, from hardware to the application layer. An attack alert is generated only if several monitors detect suspicious activity within a short temporal window. The cross-layer monitoring and integration helps ensure accurate alerts with fewer false positives and makes designing a successful attack more difficult.