{"title":"贪婪算法创造高效机制","authors":"Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis","doi":"10.1145/2764468.2764506","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study mechanisms that use greedy allocation rules and pay-your-bid pricing to allocate resources subject to a matroid constraint. We show that all such mechanisms obtain a constant fraction of the optimal welfare at any equilibrium of bidder behavior, via a smoothness argument. This unifies numerous recent results on the price of anarchy of simple auctions. Our results extend to polymatroid and matching constraints, and we discuss extensions to more general matroid intersections.","PeriodicalId":376992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"11","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Greedy Algorithms Make Efficient Mechanisms\",\"authors\":\"Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2764468.2764506\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study mechanisms that use greedy allocation rules and pay-your-bid pricing to allocate resources subject to a matroid constraint. We show that all such mechanisms obtain a constant fraction of the optimal welfare at any equilibrium of bidder behavior, via a smoothness argument. This unifies numerous recent results on the price of anarchy of simple auctions. Our results extend to polymatroid and matching constraints, and we discuss extensions to more general matroid intersections.\",\"PeriodicalId\":376992,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"volume\":\"90 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-03-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"11\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764506\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764506","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study mechanisms that use greedy allocation rules and pay-your-bid pricing to allocate resources subject to a matroid constraint. We show that all such mechanisms obtain a constant fraction of the optimal welfare at any equilibrium of bidder behavior, via a smoothness argument. This unifies numerous recent results on the price of anarchy of simple auctions. Our results extend to polymatroid and matching constraints, and we discuss extensions to more general matroid intersections.
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