{"title":"Grutter的遗产:Meredith和Pics法院如何错误地将“教育利益”例外扩展到公立高等教育的平等保护条款","authors":"Paula Beard","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.924436","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This term, the Supreme Court will decide two cases that will reshape the Equal Protection landscape. In 2003, the Court decided Grutter v. Bollinger, 530 U.S. 306 (2003), holding that the University of Michigan Law School had a compelling state interest in a diverse student body that justified its race-based admissions policy. With near-unanimous support of the academic literature, lower courts seized on Grutter's diversity rationale to uphold race-based assignment plans in K-12 public education. In June, 2006, the Court accepted certiorari in two of these cases - Meredith v. Jefferson County Public Schools, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (2006), and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 1 (PICS), 126 S.Ct. 2351 (2006) - to decide whether Grutter's diversity rationale could be extended outside the context of public higher education. This Article argues that the Meredith and PICS courts wrongly extended Grutter's rationale to K-12 public education. First, Grutter's diversity rationale is based on shaky social science and should for that reason be contained. Second, Grutter by its own terms limits the Court's holding to the context of public higher education and leaves undisturbed earlier precedent that governs race-based policies in K-12 public education. Third, the Grutter rationale, which the Court based on deference to the university's First Amendment right to decide that diverse viewpoints are necessary to its educational mission, has no application to school districts. Fourth, Grutter's diversity rationale opens a Pandora's Box when extended beyond public higher education. Fifth, even under Grutter, narrow tailoring demands that race-neutral alternatives be explored, but the Meredith and PICS courts failed to hold school districts to this requirement. As this Article explains, race-neutral alternatives are available to school districts - and such alternatives have worked - both to diversify classrooms and to enhance the academic achievement of all children.","PeriodicalId":337841,"journal":{"name":"Legal Education eJournal","volume":"170 1-2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2006-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Legacy of Grutter: How the Meredith and Pics Courts Wrongly Extended the 'Educational Benefits' Exception to the Equal Protection Clause in Public Higher Education\",\"authors\":\"Paula Beard\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.924436\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This term, the Supreme Court will decide two cases that will reshape the Equal Protection landscape. In 2003, the Court decided Grutter v. Bollinger, 530 U.S. 306 (2003), holding that the University of Michigan Law School had a compelling state interest in a diverse student body that justified its race-based admissions policy. With near-unanimous support of the academic literature, lower courts seized on Grutter's diversity rationale to uphold race-based assignment plans in K-12 public education. In June, 2006, the Court accepted certiorari in two of these cases - Meredith v. Jefferson County Public Schools, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (2006), and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 1 (PICS), 126 S.Ct. 2351 (2006) - to decide whether Grutter's diversity rationale could be extended outside the context of public higher education. This Article argues that the Meredith and PICS courts wrongly extended Grutter's rationale to K-12 public education. First, Grutter's diversity rationale is based on shaky social science and should for that reason be contained. Second, Grutter by its own terms limits the Court's holding to the context of public higher education and leaves undisturbed earlier precedent that governs race-based policies in K-12 public education. Third, the Grutter rationale, which the Court based on deference to the university's First Amendment right to decide that diverse viewpoints are necessary to its educational mission, has no application to school districts. Fourth, Grutter's diversity rationale opens a Pandora's Box when extended beyond public higher education. Fifth, even under Grutter, narrow tailoring demands that race-neutral alternatives be explored, but the Meredith and PICS courts failed to hold school districts to this requirement. As this Article explains, race-neutral alternatives are available to school districts - and such alternatives have worked - both to diversify classrooms and to enhance the academic achievement of all children.\",\"PeriodicalId\":337841,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Legal Education eJournal\",\"volume\":\"170 1-2 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2006-08-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Legal Education eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.924436\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Legal Education eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.924436","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本学期,最高法院将裁决两起将重塑平等保护格局的案件。2003年,最高法院在Grutter v. Bollinger案(530 U.S. 306(2003))中作出裁决,认为密歇根大学法学院在多元化的学生群体中具有令人信服的州利益,证明其基于种族的录取政策是合理的。在学术文献几乎一致的支持下,下级法院根据格鲁特的多样性理论,在K-12公共教育中支持基于种族的分配计划。2006年6月,法院接受了其中两起案件的调卷令——梅雷迪思诉杰斐逊县公立学校案,126 s.c.。2351(2006),以及参与社区学校的家长诉西雅图学区案,第1号(PICS), 126 s.c.。2351(2006) -决定Grutter的多样性理论是否可以扩展到公立高等教育的背景之外。本文认为Meredith和PICS法院错误地将Grutter的理论扩展到K-12公共教育。首先,格鲁特的多样性理论是建立在不可靠的社会科学基础上的,因此应该加以遏制。其次,Grutter以其自己的条款将最高法院的裁决限制在公立高等教育的背景下,而不受早期管理K-12公立教育中基于种族的政策的先例的干扰。第三,格鲁特案的基本原理不适用于学区。最高法院基于尊重大学根据《第一修正案》(First Amendment)有权决定,不同的观点对学校的教育使命是必要的。第四,在公立高等教育之外,格鲁特的多样性理论打开了潘多拉的盒子。第五,即使在Grutter案中,狭隘的剪裁要求探索种族中立的替代方案,但Meredith和PICS法院未能让学区遵守这一要求。正如这篇文章所解释的那样,学区可以采用种族中立的替代方案——这种替代方案已经奏效——既使教室多样化,又提高了所有孩子的学习成绩。
The Legacy of Grutter: How the Meredith and Pics Courts Wrongly Extended the 'Educational Benefits' Exception to the Equal Protection Clause in Public Higher Education
This term, the Supreme Court will decide two cases that will reshape the Equal Protection landscape. In 2003, the Court decided Grutter v. Bollinger, 530 U.S. 306 (2003), holding that the University of Michigan Law School had a compelling state interest in a diverse student body that justified its race-based admissions policy. With near-unanimous support of the academic literature, lower courts seized on Grutter's diversity rationale to uphold race-based assignment plans in K-12 public education. In June, 2006, the Court accepted certiorari in two of these cases - Meredith v. Jefferson County Public Schools, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (2006), and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 1 (PICS), 126 S.Ct. 2351 (2006) - to decide whether Grutter's diversity rationale could be extended outside the context of public higher education. This Article argues that the Meredith and PICS courts wrongly extended Grutter's rationale to K-12 public education. First, Grutter's diversity rationale is based on shaky social science and should for that reason be contained. Second, Grutter by its own terms limits the Court's holding to the context of public higher education and leaves undisturbed earlier precedent that governs race-based policies in K-12 public education. Third, the Grutter rationale, which the Court based on deference to the university's First Amendment right to decide that diverse viewpoints are necessary to its educational mission, has no application to school districts. Fourth, Grutter's diversity rationale opens a Pandora's Box when extended beyond public higher education. Fifth, even under Grutter, narrow tailoring demands that race-neutral alternatives be explored, but the Meredith and PICS courts failed to hold school districts to this requirement. As this Article explains, race-neutral alternatives are available to school districts - and such alternatives have worked - both to diversify classrooms and to enhance the academic achievement of all children.