破产中的有限责任合伙

C. Hurt
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引用次数: 1

摘要

Brobeck。杜威。律师事务所。海勒。泰伦。这兄弟。这些名牌律师事务所曾经有很多共同点,但今天有一个共同点:破产。单独来看,这些律所通过招聘和合并进行扩张,承担昂贵的租赁承诺,借入大量资金,一旦市场陷入低迷,执业团队分散到其他律所,它们就无法履行财务义务。这些公司还有一个共同的组织结构:有限责任合伙。在商业组织课程中,教授们教导说,如果LLP破产,并且没有资产来支付其义务,LLP的债权人将无法对个别合伙人执行这些义务。换句话说,有限责任合伙公司的合伙人不需要用个人资金开一张支票来弥补资金缺口。与有限责任合伙公司做生意的债权人,就像与公司做生意一样,承担这种风险,并且在没有明确担保的情况下,不期望个别合伙人的债权得到满足。在破产方面,债权人只指望实体的资本来满足索赔。虽然涉及普通合伙企业的破产程序可能并不常见,但至少在理论上,涉及有限责任合伙企业的破产程序最近已成为头版新闻。大型、复杂的有限责任合伙企业(如律师事务所)的解体,不符合《重述》中关于小型普通合伙企业解散相当迅速和容易的例子,原因至少有两个。首先,对合伙人个人财产没有追索权的公司债权人希望在破产程序中得到满足。在这种情况下,联邦破产法(而非合伙法)将决定LLP合伙人是否必须用个人资金开出支票来履行义务。其次,这些大型合伙企业有许多客户,他们需要持续的代理,只有一家有偿付能力的律师事务所才能全力处理这些客户。在这些情况下,解散的律师事务所既没有员工也没有财务资源来处理复杂的、长期的客户需求,如复杂的诉讼、收购或融资。这些旷日持久、利润丰厚的客户事务不可能在合伙企业法预期的时间框架内简单地“结清”。持续的客户关系开始看起来不像是一种需要履行的义务,而更像是公司的宝贵资产。合伙企业法将严格审查前合伙人在忠诚义务原则下获得公司业务,以防止篡夺商业机会和与自己的合伙企业竞争,这两项义务在普通合伙企业解散或合伙人分离时终止。然而,破产法并不像LLP法规那样宽容,破产受托人在“未完成的业务”原则下看待情况非常不同。破产受托人代表实体的资产并试图为债权人挽回价值,相反,他们寻求确保资产(包括当前的客户事务)保留在合伙解决方案中,除非交换足够的对价,即使合伙人同意让客户事务保留在退出的合伙人手中。本文认为,Heller Ehrman LLP、Howrey LLP、Dewey & LeBeouf, LLP等备受瞩目的破产案例,鲜明地表明了普通合伙法与破产法之间的冲突。混合LLP的出现创造了一个具有普通合伙特征的实体,例如共同管理权和信托义务的实施,但所有者合伙人的责任有限。这些特征和平共存,直到它们不再存在,似乎处于解体的地步。其次,有限责任的可得性改变了合伙人在解散时的激励。虽然破产法试图解决这一问题,但它与合伙企业法相冲突,造成了更多的不确定性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Limited Liability Partnership in Bankruptcy
Brobeck. Dewey. Howrey. Heller. Thelen. Coudert Brothers. These brand-name law firms had many things in common at one time, but today have one: bankruptcy. Individually, these firms expanded through hiring and mergers, took on expensive lease commitments, borrowed large sums of money, and then could not meet financial obligations once markets took a downturn and practice groups scattered to other firms. The firms also had an organizational structure in common: the limited liability partnership.In business organizations classes, professors teach that if an LLP becomes insolvent, and has no assets to pay its obligations, the creditors of the LLP will not be able to enforce those obligations against the individual partners. In other words, partners in LLPs will not have to write a check from personal funds to make up a shortfall. Creditors doing business with an LLP, just as with a corporation, take this risk and have no expectation of satisfaction of claims by individual partners, absent an express guaranty. In bankruptcy terms, creditors look solely to the capital of the entity to satisfy claims. While bankruptcy proceedings involving general partnerships may have been uncommon, at least in theory, bankruptcy proceedings involving limited liability partnerships have recently become front-page news.The disintegration of large, complex LLPs, such as law firms, does not fit within the Restatement examples of small general partnerships that dissolve fairly swiftly and easily for at least two reasons. First, firm creditors, who have no recourse to individual partners’ wealth, wish to be satisfied in a bankruptcy proceeding. In this circumstance, federal bankruptcy law, not partnership law, will determine whether LLP partners will have to write a check from personal funds to satisfy obligations. Second, these mega-partnerships have numerous clients who require ongoing representation that can only be competently handled by the full attention of a solvent law firm. In these cases, the dissolved law firm has neither the staff nor the financial resources to handle sophisticated, long-term client needs such as complex litigation, acquisitions, or financings. These prolonged, and lucrative, client matters cannot be simply “wound up” in the time frame that partnership law anticipates. The ongoing client relationship begins to look less like an obligation to be fulfilled and more like a valuable asset of the firm.Partnership law would scrutinize the taking of firm business by former partners under duty of loyalty doctrines against usurping business opportunities and competing with one’s own partnership, both duties that terminate upon the dissolution of the general partnership or the dissociation of the partner. However, bankruptcy law is not as forgiving as the LLP statutes, and bankruptcy trustees view the situation very differently under the “unfinished business” doctrine. The bankruptcy trustee, representing the assets of the entity and attempting to salvage value for creditors, instead seeks to make sure that assets, including current client matters, remain in partnership solution unless exchanged for adequate consideration, even if the partners agree to let client matters stay with the exiting partners.This Article argues that the high-profile bankruptcies of Heller Ehrman LLP, Howrey LLP, Dewey & LeBeouf, LLP, and others show in stark relief the conflict between general partnership law and bankruptcy law. The emergence of the hybrid LLP creates an entity with general partnership characteristics, such as the right to co-manage and the imposition of fiduciary duties, but with limited liability for owner-partners. These characteristics co-exist peacefully until they do not, which seems to be at the point of dissolution. Then, the availability of limited liability changes partners’ incentives upon dissolution. Though bankruptcy law attempts to resolve this, it conflicts with partnership law to create more uncertainty.
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