认识论辩护的义务论概念

W. Alston
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引用次数: 211

摘要

"被证明","证明"和它们的同音词,最自然的理解是,我们可以用"义务论"的方式,把它们理解为与义务,许可,要求,责备等等有关。我们可以把要求、禁止和允许看作基本的义务论术语,把义务和义务看作要求的种类,而把责任、责备、责备、赞扬、功绩、清白等看作规范意义
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification
The terms, 'justified', 'justification', and their cognates are most naturally understood in what we may term a "deontological" way, as having to do with obligation, permission, requirement, blame, and the like. We may think of requirement, prohibition, and permission as the basic deontological terms, with obligation, and duty as species of requirement, and with responsibility, blameworthiness, reproach, praiseworthiness, merit, being in the clear, etc. as normative conse
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