内幕交易模式

Lee Biggerstaff, David C. Cicero, M. B. Wintoki
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引用次数: 33

摘要

我们发现,公司内部人士进行交易的时间更长,因为他们可能拥有长期的信息优势。控制内部人士交易策略的持续时间,他们的销售和购买都预示着可观的平均异常回报。我们讨论了未能解释这些交易模式如何掩盖了内幕交易的回报,并展示了对这些交易模式的解释如何有助于为利用信息进行交易的公司内部人士提供清晰的屏幕。我们还提供证据表明,内幕人士试图通过在市场收盘后披露他们的交易来保持他们的信息优势,以最大化交易利润。当内部人士在营业时间之后报告他们的交易时,他们更有可能参与延长的交易序列,他们交易的股票总体上更多,他们的交易预示着更大的异常回报。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Insider Trading Patterns
We find that corporate insiders trade over longer periods of time when they may have a longer-lived informational advantage. Controlling for the duration of insiders' trading strategies, both their sales and purchases predict sizable abnormal returns on average. We discuss how failure to account for these trading patterns has previously masked the returns to insider trading, and show how accounting for them helps sharpen screens for corporate insiders who trade on information. We also provide evidence that insiders attempt to preserve their informational advantage to maximize trading profits by disclosing their trades after the market has closed. When insiders report their trades after business hours they are more likely to engage in extended sequences of trades, they trade more shares overall, and their trades predict larger abnormal returns.
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