国际共同基金业的外包:一个均衡的观点

O. Chuprinin, M. Massa, David Schumacher
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引用次数: 55

摘要

我们研究国际资产管理公司之间的外包关系。我们发现,在同时管理外包基金和内部基金的公司中,内部基金的年回报率比外包基金高0.85%(占费用率的57%)。我们将这一结果归因于通过优先分配ipo、交易机会和交叉交易对内部基金的优惠待遇,特别是在内部基金面临大幅流出和需要流动性的时候。我们用代理问题来解释优惠待遇:它随着分包商的市场力量和监控分包商的难度而增加,随着分包商平行内部活动的数量而减少。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Outsourcing in the International Mutual Fund Industry: An Equilibrium View
type="main"> We study outsourcing relationships among international asset management firms. We find that, in companies that manage both outsourced and in-house funds, in-house funds outperform outsourced funds by 0.85% annually (57% of the expense ratio). We attribute this result to preferential treatment of in-house funds via the preferential allocation of IPOs, trading opportunities, and cross-trades, especially at times when in-house funds face steep outflows and require liquidity. We explain preferential treatment with agency problems: it increases with the subcontractor's market power and the difficulty of monitoring the subcontractor, and decreases with the subcontractor's amount of parallel in-house activity.
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