{"title":"玩弄审计彩票:长期资本控股诉美国案后罚金在美国税法中的作用","authors":"Yoram Keinan","doi":"10.15779/Z38M86R","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introdu ction .................................................................................................. 383 II. The Econom ics of Penalties ........................................................................ 388 A . Introduction ..................................................................................... 388 B. The Utilitarian-Economic Theory .................................................... 390 C . Sanctions as Prices ........................................................................... 390 1. The Strict A pproach .................................................................. 392 2. The Interm ediate Theory ........................................................... 392 3. The Moral/Ethical Approach .................................................... 393 D . C onclusions ..................................................................................... 394 Il. Tax Penalty and D eterrence ....................................................................... 394 A . Cost-B enefit Equation ..................................................................... 394 B. The Tax Department as a Profit-Maximization Unit ....................... 396 C. Avoiding Overdeterrence ................................................................. 397 IV . Tax Accuracy-Related Penalties ................................................................ 398 A . O verview ......................................................................................... 398","PeriodicalId":326069,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Playing the Audit Lottery: The Role of Penalties in the U.S. Tax Law in the Aftermath of Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States\",\"authors\":\"Yoram Keinan\",\"doi\":\"10.15779/Z38M86R\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introdu ction .................................................................................................. 383 II. The Econom ics of Penalties ........................................................................ 388 A . Introduction ..................................................................................... 388 B. The Utilitarian-Economic Theory .................................................... 390 C . Sanctions as Prices ........................................................................... 390 1. The Strict A pproach .................................................................. 392 2. The Interm ediate Theory ........................................................... 392 3. The Moral/Ethical Approach .................................................... 393 D . C onclusions ..................................................................................... 394 Il. Tax Penalty and D eterrence ....................................................................... 394 A . Cost-B enefit Equation ..................................................................... 394 B. The Tax Department as a Profit-Maximization Unit ....................... 396 C. Avoiding Overdeterrence ................................................................. 397 IV . Tax Accuracy-Related Penalties ................................................................ 398 A . O verview ......................................................................................... 398\",\"PeriodicalId\":326069,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Berkeley Business Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Berkeley Business Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38M86R\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Berkeley Business Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38M86R","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Playing the Audit Lottery: The Role of Penalties in the U.S. Tax Law in the Aftermath of Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introdu ction .................................................................................................. 383 II. The Econom ics of Penalties ........................................................................ 388 A . Introduction ..................................................................................... 388 B. The Utilitarian-Economic Theory .................................................... 390 C . Sanctions as Prices ........................................................................... 390 1. The Strict A pproach .................................................................. 392 2. The Interm ediate Theory ........................................................... 392 3. The Moral/Ethical Approach .................................................... 393 D . C onclusions ..................................................................................... 394 Il. Tax Penalty and D eterrence ....................................................................... 394 A . Cost-B enefit Equation ..................................................................... 394 B. The Tax Department as a Profit-Maximization Unit ....................... 396 C. Avoiding Overdeterrence ................................................................. 397 IV . Tax Accuracy-Related Penalties ................................................................ 398 A . O verview ......................................................................................... 398