规律与正确性

R. Alexy
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引用次数: 24

摘要

本章的主要论点是,法律必然提出对正确性的主张,而法律与正确性之间的这种必要联系意味着法律与道德之间在概念上的必要联系,这种联系超出了实证主义法律概念的范围。对正确性命题的主张提出了许多反对意见。特别有意义的论点是,确实有可能提出正确的要求,但这不是必要的。这里给出的回答是,相对于一种实践而言,对正确性的主张是必要的,这种实践本质上是由真或对、假或错的区别所定义的。然而,这种做法是一种特殊的做法。的确,人们可以尝试摒弃真理、正确性和客观性的范畴。但是,如果我们能够成功地做到这一点,我们的言语和行为将与现在有本质的不同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Law and Correctness
The main thesis of this chapter is that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness and that this necessary connection between law and correctness implies a conceptually necessary connection between law and morality that goes beyond the scope of a positivistic concept of law. Many objections have been raised to the claim to correctness thesis. Of special significance is the argument that it is, indeed, possible to raise the claim to correctness, but that it is not necessary. The reply presented here is that the claim to correctness is necessary relative to a practice that is essentially defined by the distinction of true or correct and false or wrong. This practice, however, is of a special kind. Indeed, one can try to dismiss the categories of truth, correctness, and objectivity. But if we should succeed in doing so, our speaking and acting would be essentially different from what they are now.
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