债务及无力偿债

J. B. Heaton
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引用次数: 0

摘要

法律规则在安全设计中发挥着强大但尚未得到充分研究的作用。本文提出了关于债务契约设计的两个新的理论结果。这一结果源于这样一个前提,即公司在发行新债时必须避免法定破产,因为在发行时破产会对发行人造成严重的经营限制。我首先表明,法定破产限制了债务能力,限制了公司可以通过债务筹集的资金数量。接下来我将说明,法定破产限制了企业向新债权人承诺的收益,这有助于解释为什么超高收益的新发行债券没有市场。这篇文章的结果表明,法定破产可能在限制债务能力和债务收益率方面具有重要的作用——如果很大程度上不被注意的话。更一般地说,本文说明了更好地理解法律偿付能力要求的有用性,这种法律机制在理解债务和安全设计方面受到的关注太少。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Debt and Insolvency
Legal rules play a powerful but understudied role in security design. This article presents two new theoretical results about the design of debt contracts. The results derive from the premise that firms must avoid legal insolvency when issuing new debt because insolvency at issuance would trigger severe operational limitations on the issuer. I first show that legal insolvency limits debt capacity, limiting the amount of money that a firm can raise with debt. I next show that legal insolvency limits the yield that firms can promise new creditors, helping to explain why there is no market for ultra-high-yield new issue debt. The article’s results demonstrate that legal insolvency probably has important – if largely unnoticed – effects in limiting debt capacity and debt yields. More generally, the article illustrates the usefulness of better understanding legal solvency requirements, a legal mechanism that has received too little attention in the understanding of debt and security design.
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