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引用次数: 0
摘要
斯特劳森(P. F. Strawson)对真理的解释是，当真理适用于陈述时，他说:“当且仅当一个人做出陈述或断言时，他所陈述的事物是真实的，他才会做出真实的陈述。”这种解释与其他解释的不同之处在于，它把一个陈述的内容(即它说事物是这样那样的)作为真理归属的前提。本文展示了这一特征如何为“说谎者悖论”的独特解决方案开辟了道路，并为许多逻辑学家现在青睐的公理真理理论奠定了基础。
P. F. Strawson explained truth, as it applies to statements, by saying: ‘one who makes a statement or assertion makes a true statement if and only if things are as, in making the statement, he states them to be’. This explanation differs from others in taking a statement’s having a content (i.e. its saying that things are thus-and-so) to be a presupposition of an attribution of truth to it. This paper shows how this feature opens the way to a distinctive solution to the Liar Paradox and to a foundation for the axiomatic theories of truth now favoured by many logicians.
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