国际关系中的指责与共谋:使不干涉在道德上可以承受

E. Rousseau, Thierry Braspenning-Balzacq
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引用次数: 2

摘要

各国曾在不同场合谴责其他国家或集团犯下的大规模暴行;但这很少导致采取任何措施来纠正这种不幸的局面。因此,本文提出了一个问题:当指责者缺乏或不愿使用惩罚违法者的权力或权威时,指责有什么作用?与侧重于指责不法行为者的影响的方法不同,我们认为,公开将不法行为的责任归咎于另一个国家或非国家行为体已成为塑造国内外对政府看法的规范策略。具体来说,国际指责有两个主要目的:一个是即时的沟通功能,即表达道德抗议;另一个是面向未来的目的,即消除未来对同谋的指控。我们认为,这种规范性策略的必然结果是使不干预在道德上可以接受。因此,虽然原则上责备者可能会支持被违反的规范并重视受害者,但通过转移人们对责备的道义承诺的注意力,责备的战略性使用往往会使不作为合法化。因此,这篇文章警告不要将指责作为一种超权行为(即一种不是强制性的但其表现值得赞扬的行为)和一种道德上的澄清(即指责者承认问题,但将寻找解决办法的责任留给国际社会)。相反,我们认为,虽然指责将行为的责任归咎于行为者,但它也将指责者置于特定的道德情境中:采取措施打断正在展开的行动的必要性。我们的分析使我们提出了一个貌似合理的规范,它扩大了国际政治中共谋的范围:只要其他行为体(国家或非国家)违反了指责所要求的道德义务,国家就会成为其不法行为的同谋。换句话说,责备就是承诺自己采取行动,尽管这种行动的确切性质各不相同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Blame and Complicity in International Relations: Making Non-intervention Morally Bearable
On various occasions, states have condemned other nations or groups for mass atrocities they commit; but this rarely leads to any step to redress the untoward situation. This article therefore asks: What functions does blame serve when the blamers lack – or are reluctant to use – the power or authority to punish transgressors? Unlike approaches that focus on the effects of blaming on the wrongdoer, we argue that openly attributing responsibility for wrongdoings to another state or non-state actor has become a normative strategy to shape the way a government is perceived domestically and abroad. Specifically, international blame serves two main objectives: an immediate, communicative function, that is, to express moral protest, and a future-oriented purpose, that is, to dispel future indictment of complicity. We suggest that a corollary of this normative strategy is to make non-intervention morally acceptable. Thus, while in principle the blamer might stand up for the violated norm and value the victims, the strategic use of blame tends to legitimate inaction, by diverting attention away from blaming’s deontic commitments. The article therefore warns against the instrumental use of blame as an act of supererogation (that is, an act that is not compulsory but whose performance is praiseworthy), and as a form of moral clearance (whereby the blamer acknowledges the issue but leaves responsibility for finding solution to the international society). Rather, while blaming ascribes responsibility for the act to an agent, we argue, it also puts the blamer in a specific moral situation: the necessity to take measures that interrupt the unfolding action. Our analysis leads us to put forward a plausible norm that broadens the scope of complicity in international politics: states become complicit in the wrongdoing of other actors (states or non-states) whenever they violate moral obligations that blaming demands. In other words, to blame is to commit oneself to act, though the exact nature of this action varies.
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