{"title":"权利与利益的模糊关系","authors":"Rowan Cruft","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198793366.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Chapter 2 examines the relation between rights, interests, and desires, focusing on Raz’s and Kramer’s differing Interest Theories and Wenar’s recent Kind-Desire Theory. It argues that none of the theories respect our ability to create rights wherever we wish through law or promising, independently of the interests and desires of the right-holder. It argues nonetheless that Raz’s theory succeeds as a sufficient condition on right-holding, while Kramer’s and Wenar’s distinct theories come very close as necessary conditions. The chapter argues that it is easy to overlook the limitations of the theories because every right creates a circular ‘status desire’ or ‘status interest’ in its own fulfilment, borne by the right-holder in virtue of her status as holding a right.","PeriodicalId":441247,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Rights’ Elusive Relation to Interests\",\"authors\":\"Rowan Cruft\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780198793366.003.0002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Chapter 2 examines the relation between rights, interests, and desires, focusing on Raz’s and Kramer’s differing Interest Theories and Wenar’s recent Kind-Desire Theory. It argues that none of the theories respect our ability to create rights wherever we wish through law or promising, independently of the interests and desires of the right-holder. It argues nonetheless that Raz’s theory succeeds as a sufficient condition on right-holding, while Kramer’s and Wenar’s distinct theories come very close as necessary conditions. The chapter argues that it is easy to overlook the limitations of the theories because every right creates a circular ‘status desire’ or ‘status interest’ in its own fulfilment, borne by the right-holder in virtue of her status as holding a right.\",\"PeriodicalId\":441247,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual\",\"volume\":\"8 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-09-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198793366.003.0002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198793366.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Chapter 2 examines the relation between rights, interests, and desires, focusing on Raz’s and Kramer’s differing Interest Theories and Wenar’s recent Kind-Desire Theory. It argues that none of the theories respect our ability to create rights wherever we wish through law or promising, independently of the interests and desires of the right-holder. It argues nonetheless that Raz’s theory succeeds as a sufficient condition on right-holding, while Kramer’s and Wenar’s distinct theories come very close as necessary conditions. The chapter argues that it is easy to overlook the limitations of the theories because every right creates a circular ‘status desire’ or ‘status interest’ in its own fulfilment, borne by the right-holder in virtue of her status as holding a right.