{"title":"外包中央银行业务:爱沙尼亚的经验教训","authors":"S. Khoury, C. Wihlborg","doi":"10.1080/13841280600772051","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"An orthodox currency board (CB) renders central banking redundant for interest and exchange rate determination. Thereby, monetary policy is de facto outsourced. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in banking can lead to outsourcing of the second important central bank function, responsibility for banking supervision. Economic and political conditions for outsourcing of central banking are discussed. Estonia's experience with a CB and expanding foreign involvement in banking is reviewed. The Argentine CB experience is discussed briefly to provide a contrast. The conclusion outlines the conditions for successful currency outsourcing to another country or regional authority.","PeriodicalId":244385,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Policy Reform","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Outsourcing Central Banking: Lessons from Estonia\",\"authors\":\"S. Khoury, C. Wihlborg\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/13841280600772051\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"An orthodox currency board (CB) renders central banking redundant for interest and exchange rate determination. Thereby, monetary policy is de facto outsourced. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in banking can lead to outsourcing of the second important central bank function, responsibility for banking supervision. Economic and political conditions for outsourcing of central banking are discussed. Estonia's experience with a CB and expanding foreign involvement in banking is reviewed. The Argentine CB experience is discussed briefly to provide a contrast. The conclusion outlines the conditions for successful currency outsourcing to another country or regional authority.\",\"PeriodicalId\":244385,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Journal of Policy Reform\",\"volume\":\"64 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2006-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Journal of Policy Reform\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280600772051\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Journal of Policy Reform","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13841280600772051","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
An orthodox currency board (CB) renders central banking redundant for interest and exchange rate determination. Thereby, monetary policy is de facto outsourced. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in banking can lead to outsourcing of the second important central bank function, responsibility for banking supervision. Economic and political conditions for outsourcing of central banking are discussed. Estonia's experience with a CB and expanding foreign involvement in banking is reviewed. The Argentine CB experience is discussed briefly to provide a contrast. The conclusion outlines the conditions for successful currency outsourcing to another country or regional authority.
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