{"title":"义务侵权中的关节雕刻","authors":"Ahson Azmat","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190865269.003.0013","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter argues that non-instrumental, deontic approaches to tort law—like Corrective Justice or Civil Recourse Theory—presuppose an unspecified and undefended non-naturalist account of the normativity of civil wrongs. Linking this puzzle to current debate within metaphysics, the chapter argues that a deontic theory of tort must be a theory of legal grounding—that is, an account of the relationship between torts and the facts that underwrite them. It specifies a model of the logical form of this grounding relationship and then examines whether it is a metaphysical or, instead, a sui generis legal relationship. The chapter then turns squarely to Corrective Justice and Civil Recourse Theory to determine whether they can make good on their metaphysical presuppositions.","PeriodicalId":297088,"journal":{"name":"Civil Wrongs and Justice in Private Law","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Joint-Carving in Deontic Tort\",\"authors\":\"Ahson Azmat\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780190865269.003.0013\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter argues that non-instrumental, deontic approaches to tort law—like Corrective Justice or Civil Recourse Theory—presuppose an unspecified and undefended non-naturalist account of the normativity of civil wrongs. Linking this puzzle to current debate within metaphysics, the chapter argues that a deontic theory of tort must be a theory of legal grounding—that is, an account of the relationship between torts and the facts that underwrite them. It specifies a model of the logical form of this grounding relationship and then examines whether it is a metaphysical or, instead, a sui generis legal relationship. The chapter then turns squarely to Corrective Justice and Civil Recourse Theory to determine whether they can make good on their metaphysical presuppositions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":297088,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Civil Wrongs and Justice in Private Law\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-03-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Civil Wrongs and Justice in Private Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190865269.003.0013\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Civil Wrongs and Justice in Private Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190865269.003.0013","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter argues that non-instrumental, deontic approaches to tort law—like Corrective Justice or Civil Recourse Theory—presuppose an unspecified and undefended non-naturalist account of the normativity of civil wrongs. Linking this puzzle to current debate within metaphysics, the chapter argues that a deontic theory of tort must be a theory of legal grounding—that is, an account of the relationship between torts and the facts that underwrite them. It specifies a model of the logical form of this grounding relationship and then examines whether it is a metaphysical or, instead, a sui generis legal relationship. The chapter then turns squarely to Corrective Justice and Civil Recourse Theory to determine whether they can make good on their metaphysical presuppositions.