Independent Economic Regulators in Belgium: Contextualising Local Resistance to a Global Trend in the Light of the Belgian Economic Constitution

Inspired by the American experience, the European Union has made it compulsory for Member States since the 1990s to entrust certain regulatory powers to national authorities independent from the government in several sectors of the economy. Such a development is part of a larger trend that has taken place at the global level since the 1980s. The choice for independent regulators with wide powers must ensure credible and effective regulation of the economy, away from the shortterm thinking that plagues politicians. Yet, the creation of independent regulators of the economy does not fit well with the constitutional, political and economic traditions of several European states, such as Belgium. In Belgium, the creation of independent economic regulators has faced resistance. Using Belgium as a case-study, this paper seeks to contextualise this resistance and argues that it should be understood in the light of the mismatch between the (neo-liberal) view regarding the respective roles of 'experts', politicians and economic actors in the regulation of the economy that is behind the creation of independent economic regulators and the Belgian economic constitution.