{"title":"Java堆栈检查的IRM实施","authors":"Ú. Erlingsson, F. Schneider","doi":"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848461","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Two implementations are given for Java's stack inspection access-control policy. Each implementation is obtained by generating an inlined reference monitor (IRM) for a different formulation of the policy. Performance of the implementations is evaluated, and one is found to be competitive with Java's less flexible, JVM-resident implementation. The exercise illustrates the power of the IRM approach for enforcing security policies.","PeriodicalId":373624,"journal":{"name":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2000-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"351","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"IRM enforcement of Java stack inspection\",\"authors\":\"Ú. Erlingsson, F. Schneider\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848461\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Two implementations are given for Java's stack inspection access-control policy. Each implementation is obtained by generating an inlined reference monitor (IRM) for a different formulation of the policy. Performance of the implementations is evaluated, and one is found to be competitive with Java's less flexible, JVM-resident implementation. The exercise illustrates the power of the IRM approach for enforcing security policies.\",\"PeriodicalId\":373624,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2000-02-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"351\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848461\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceeding 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. S&P 2000","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848461","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Two implementations are given for Java's stack inspection access-control policy. Each implementation is obtained by generating an inlined reference monitor (IRM) for a different formulation of the policy. Performance of the implementations is evaluated, and one is found to be competitive with Java's less flexible, JVM-resident implementation. The exercise illustrates the power of the IRM approach for enforcing security policies.
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