在比赛激励环境下,多重任务是否会增强不诚实行为?

N. Alotaibi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究调查了在多任务和非多任务环境下,基于比赛的激励方案是否会增加或减少审计师的不当行为(不诚实)。我们精确地比较了多任务工作环境和非多任务工作环境及其减少非行为过程的能力。在两个不同的环境(在线和实验室)中进行了两个不同的实验,所有这些任务都受到比赛激励计划的影响。253名参与者被随机分配到两种处理(多任务或只有一项任务)中的一种,他们有绝对的自由做出决定,而不受监督。我们的研究结果表明,有可信的证据表明,无论是在有社会互动的实验室环境中,还是在没有社会互动的网络环境中,激励竞赛计划环境中的多任务处理都能有效地防止员工的不诚实行为。这些实验对人力资源管理者避免员工在工作表现中出现不诚实行为具有重要的启示意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do multiple tasks enhance dishonesty in tournament incentives environment?
This study investigates whether the possibility of incentive-based on tournaments scheme increases or decreases misbehavior (dishonesty) among auditors when it is being applied under multi-tasks and non-multi-tasks environments. We precisely compare a multi-tasking work environment with a non-multi-tasking work environment and its ability to reduce non-behavioral processes. Two different experiments were conducted in two different environments (online and laboratory) where all these tasks are subjected to tournaments incentives scheme. 253 participants are assigned randomly to one of the two treatments (multi-tasks, or only one task) and they have absolute freedom to make a decision without monitoring. Our result shows that there is credible evidence that multi-tasking in incentive tournament schemes environment can highly prevent dishonesty among worker’s performance whether in laboratory environment when the social interaction is present or online environment when the social interaction is absent. These experiments have important implications for human resources managers in order to avoid workers’ dishonesty in the performance of their jobs.
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