驯服复杂性:理性、证据法与法律制度的本质

R. Allen
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引用次数: 17

摘要

本文探讨了复杂性对理解证据法和法律制度本质的影响。在批判性分析的命题中,理解理性意义的一般问题的一个重要方法是,它涉及到对理解和调节敌对环境的工具的多元搜索。证据法被概念化为这一努力的一个子集,至少在某种程度上,涉及寻找工具来规范几乎无限复杂的潜在相关证据领域,同时适应政策要求。然后,这个命题被认为,作为证据系统一部分的法律体系具有可能无法从其组成部分推导出来的涌现属性,这表明它可能是,或至少具有与复杂适应系统高度类似的属性。这一分析的一个含义是,标准学术研究的工具严重依赖于将分析问题分离并简化为可管理的单元,从而使它们能够采用标准的演绎方法,因此可能需要补充有助于调节流体动力学等复杂自然现象的分析工具。这对法律作为规则的概念这样的事情有着直接的影响,因此对主导法学界50年的哈特/德沃金辩论也有直接的影响。这场辩论可能错误地描述了它所探究的对象,因此,德沃宁解决实证主义困难的方法是不适用的。即使这是错误的,也可以证明德沃宁解是不可实现的,不能合理地近似。整个法律系统内的法律问题的解决方案(与法律系统内的任何特定节点相比)是通过对发生在高度互联的节点集(与神经网络相似)中的最佳解释的推理过程得出的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Taming Complexity: Rationality, the Law of Evidence, and the Nature of the Legal System
This essay explores the implications of complexity for understanding both the law of evidence and the nature of the legal system. Among the propositions critically analyzed is that one significant way to understand the general problem of the meaning of rationality is that it has involved a multivariate search for tools to understand and regulate a hostile environment. The law of evidence is conceptualized as a subset of this effort, at least in part, as involving a search for tools to regulate the almost infinitely complex domain of potentially relevant evidence and at the same time to accommodate policy demands. The proposition is then considered that the legal system of which the evidentiary system is a part has emergent properties that may not be deducible from its component parts and that suggest that it may be, or at least has properties highly analogous to, a complex adaptive system. One implication of this analysis is that the tools of standard academic research that rely heavily on the isolation and reduction of analytical problems to manageable units to permit them to be subjected to standard deductive methodologies may need to be supplemented with analytical tools that facilitate the regulation of complex natural phenomena such as fluid dynamics. This has direct implications for such things as the conception of law as rules, and thus for the Hart/Dworkin debate that has dominated jurisprudence for 50 years. That debate may have mis-characterized the object of its inquiry, and thus the Dworkinian solution to the difficulties of positivism is inapplicable. Even if that is wrong, it can be shown that the Dworkinian solution is not achievable and cannot rationally be approximated. Solutions to legal problems within the legal system as a whole (as compared to any particular node within the legal system) are arrived at through a process of inference to the best explanation that occurs within a highly interconnected set of nodes that has similarities to a neural network.
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