Yunfeng Zhao, Zhicheng Liu, Chao Qiu, Xiaofei Wang, F. Yu, Victor C. M. Leung
{"title":"端缘云分层联邦学习中大数据交易的激励机制","authors":"Yunfeng Zhao, Zhicheng Liu, Chao Qiu, Xiaofei Wang, F. Yu, Victor C. M. Leung","doi":"10.1109/GLOBECOM46510.2021.9685514","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"As a compelling collaborative machine learning framework in the big data era, federated learning allows multiple participants to jointly train a model without revealing their private data. To further leverage the ubiquitous resources in end-edge-cloud systems, hierarchical federated learning (HFL) focuses on the layered feature to relieve the excessive communication overhead and the risk of data leakage. For end devices are often considered as self-interested and reluctant to join in model training, encouraging them to participate becomes an emerging and challenging issue, which deeply impacts training performance and has not been well considered yet. This paper proposes an incentive mechanism for HFL in end-edge-cloud systems, which motivates end devices to contribute data for model training. The hierarchical training process in end-edge-cloud systems is modeled as a multi-layer Stackelberg game where sub-games are interconnected through the utility functions. We derive the Nash equilibrium strategies and closed-form solutions to guide players. Due to fully grasping the inner interest relationship among players, the proposed mechanism could exchange the low costs for the high model performance. Simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism and reveal stakeholder's dependencies on the allocation of data resources.","PeriodicalId":200641,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An Incentive Mechanism for Big Data Trading in End-Edge-Cloud Hierarchical Federated Learning\",\"authors\":\"Yunfeng Zhao, Zhicheng Liu, Chao Qiu, Xiaofei Wang, F. Yu, Victor C. M. Leung\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/GLOBECOM46510.2021.9685514\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"As a compelling collaborative machine learning framework in the big data era, federated learning allows multiple participants to jointly train a model without revealing their private data. To further leverage the ubiquitous resources in end-edge-cloud systems, hierarchical federated learning (HFL) focuses on the layered feature to relieve the excessive communication overhead and the risk of data leakage. For end devices are often considered as self-interested and reluctant to join in model training, encouraging them to participate becomes an emerging and challenging issue, which deeply impacts training performance and has not been well considered yet. This paper proposes an incentive mechanism for HFL in end-edge-cloud systems, which motivates end devices to contribute data for model training. The hierarchical training process in end-edge-cloud systems is modeled as a multi-layer Stackelberg game where sub-games are interconnected through the utility functions. We derive the Nash equilibrium strategies and closed-form solutions to guide players. Due to fully grasping the inner interest relationship among players, the proposed mechanism could exchange the low costs for the high model performance. Simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism and reveal stakeholder's dependencies on the allocation of data resources.\",\"PeriodicalId\":200641,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2021 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)\",\"volume\":\"6 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2021 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOBECOM46510.2021.9685514\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2021 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOBECOM46510.2021.9685514","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
An Incentive Mechanism for Big Data Trading in End-Edge-Cloud Hierarchical Federated Learning
As a compelling collaborative machine learning framework in the big data era, federated learning allows multiple participants to jointly train a model without revealing their private data. To further leverage the ubiquitous resources in end-edge-cloud systems, hierarchical federated learning (HFL) focuses on the layered feature to relieve the excessive communication overhead and the risk of data leakage. For end devices are often considered as self-interested and reluctant to join in model training, encouraging them to participate becomes an emerging and challenging issue, which deeply impacts training performance and has not been well considered yet. This paper proposes an incentive mechanism for HFL in end-edge-cloud systems, which motivates end devices to contribute data for model training. The hierarchical training process in end-edge-cloud systems is modeled as a multi-layer Stackelberg game where sub-games are interconnected through the utility functions. We derive the Nash equilibrium strategies and closed-form solutions to guide players. Due to fully grasping the inner interest relationship among players, the proposed mechanism could exchange the low costs for the high model performance. Simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism and reveal stakeholder's dependencies on the allocation of data resources.