Shaza Zeitouni, Emmanuel Stapf, H. Fereidooni, A. Sadeghi
{"title":"基于强忆阻器的物理不可克隆函数的安全性研究","authors":"Shaza Zeitouni, Emmanuel Stapf, H. Fereidooni, A. Sadeghi","doi":"10.1109/DAC18072.2020.9218491","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"PUFs are cost-effective security primitives that extract unique identifiers from integrated circuits. However, since their introduction, PUFs have been subject to modeling attacks based on machine learning. Recently, researchers explored emerging nano-electronic technologies, e.g., memristors, to construct hybrid-PUFs, which outperform CMOS-only PUFs and are claimed to be more resilient to modeling attacks. However, since such PUF designs are not open-source, the security claims remain dubious. In this paper, we reproduce a set of memristor-PUFs and extensively evaluate their unpredictability property. By leveraging state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms, we show that it is feasible to successfully model memristor-PUFs with high prediction rates of 98%. Even incorporating XOR gates, to further strengthen PUFs’ against modeling attacks, has a negligible effect.","PeriodicalId":428807,"journal":{"name":"2020 57th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On the Security of Strong Memristor-based Physically Unclonable Functions\",\"authors\":\"Shaza Zeitouni, Emmanuel Stapf, H. Fereidooni, A. Sadeghi\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/DAC18072.2020.9218491\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"PUFs are cost-effective security primitives that extract unique identifiers from integrated circuits. However, since their introduction, PUFs have been subject to modeling attacks based on machine learning. Recently, researchers explored emerging nano-electronic technologies, e.g., memristors, to construct hybrid-PUFs, which outperform CMOS-only PUFs and are claimed to be more resilient to modeling attacks. However, since such PUF designs are not open-source, the security claims remain dubious. In this paper, we reproduce a set of memristor-PUFs and extensively evaluate their unpredictability property. By leveraging state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms, we show that it is feasible to successfully model memristor-PUFs with high prediction rates of 98%. Even incorporating XOR gates, to further strengthen PUFs’ against modeling attacks, has a negligible effect.\",\"PeriodicalId\":428807,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2020 57th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)\",\"volume\":\"49 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2020 57th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/DAC18072.2020.9218491\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2020 57th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/DAC18072.2020.9218491","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
On the Security of Strong Memristor-based Physically Unclonable Functions
PUFs are cost-effective security primitives that extract unique identifiers from integrated circuits. However, since their introduction, PUFs have been subject to modeling attacks based on machine learning. Recently, researchers explored emerging nano-electronic technologies, e.g., memristors, to construct hybrid-PUFs, which outperform CMOS-only PUFs and are claimed to be more resilient to modeling attacks. However, since such PUF designs are not open-source, the security claims remain dubious. In this paper, we reproduce a set of memristor-PUFs and extensively evaluate their unpredictability property. By leveraging state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms, we show that it is feasible to successfully model memristor-PUFs with high prediction rates of 98%. Even incorporating XOR gates, to further strengthen PUFs’ against modeling attacks, has a negligible effect.