{"title":"带有线和缓存监听的缓存广播信道类型II:多个库文件","authors":"Mohamed S. Nafea, A. Yener","doi":"10.1109/ALLERTON.2018.8635931","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A wiretap model with two receivers equipped with fixed-size cache memories, and a type II adversary is considered. The adversary in this model chooses a subset of symbols to tap into either from cache placement, delivery transmission, or both phases. The legitimate parties do not know the fractions or the positions of the tapped symbols in either phase. For a library of size three files or more, lower and upper bounds on the strong secrecy capacity, i.e., the maximum achievable file rate while keeping the overall library strongly secure, are derived. The strong secrecy capacity is identified for the instance of large tapped subsets. Achievability is established by wiretap coding, security embedding codes, one-time pad keys, and coded caching techniques. The upper bound is constructed by three successive channel transformations.","PeriodicalId":299280,"journal":{"name":"2018 56th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)","volume":"189 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Caching Broadcast Channel with a Wire and Cache Tapping Adversary of Type II: Multiple Library Files\",\"authors\":\"Mohamed S. Nafea, A. Yener\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ALLERTON.2018.8635931\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A wiretap model with two receivers equipped with fixed-size cache memories, and a type II adversary is considered. The adversary in this model chooses a subset of symbols to tap into either from cache placement, delivery transmission, or both phases. The legitimate parties do not know the fractions or the positions of the tapped symbols in either phase. For a library of size three files or more, lower and upper bounds on the strong secrecy capacity, i.e., the maximum achievable file rate while keeping the overall library strongly secure, are derived. The strong secrecy capacity is identified for the instance of large tapped subsets. Achievability is established by wiretap coding, security embedding codes, one-time pad keys, and coded caching techniques. The upper bound is constructed by three successive channel transformations.\",\"PeriodicalId\":299280,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2018 56th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)\",\"volume\":\"189 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2018 56th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2018.8635931\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2018 56th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2018.8635931","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Caching Broadcast Channel with a Wire and Cache Tapping Adversary of Type II: Multiple Library Files
A wiretap model with two receivers equipped with fixed-size cache memories, and a type II adversary is considered. The adversary in this model chooses a subset of symbols to tap into either from cache placement, delivery transmission, or both phases. The legitimate parties do not know the fractions or the positions of the tapped symbols in either phase. For a library of size three files or more, lower and upper bounds on the strong secrecy capacity, i.e., the maximum achievable file rate while keeping the overall library strongly secure, are derived. The strong secrecy capacity is identified for the instance of large tapped subsets. Achievability is established by wiretap coding, security embedding codes, one-time pad keys, and coded caching techniques. The upper bound is constructed by three successive channel transformations.