运行时硬件木马检测和恢复的高级综合

Xiaotong Cui, K. Ma, Liang Shi, Kaijie Wu
{"title":"运行时硬件木马检测和恢复的高级综合","authors":"Xiaotong Cui, K. Ma, Liang Shi, Kaijie Wu","doi":"10.1145/2593069.2593150","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Current Integrated Circuit (IC) development process raises security concerns about hardware Trojan which are maliciously inserted to alter functional behavior or leak sensitive information. Most of the hardware Trojan detection techniques rely on a golden (trusted) IC against which to compare a suspected one. Hence they cannot be applied to designs using third party Intellectual Property (IP) cores where golden IP is unavailable. Moreover, due to the stealthy nature of hardware Trojan, there is no technique that can guarantee Trojan-free after manufacturing test. As a result, Trojan detection and recovery at run time acting as the last line of defense is necessary especially for mission-critical applications. In this paper, we propose design rules to assist run-time Trojan detection and fast recovery by exploring diversity of untrusted third party IP cores. With these design rules, we show the optimization approach to minimize the cost of implementation in terms of the number of different IP cores used by the implementation.","PeriodicalId":433816,"journal":{"name":"2014 51st ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"49","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"High-level synthesis for run-time hardware Trojan detection and recovery\",\"authors\":\"Xiaotong Cui, K. Ma, Liang Shi, Kaijie Wu\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2593069.2593150\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Current Integrated Circuit (IC) development process raises security concerns about hardware Trojan which are maliciously inserted to alter functional behavior or leak sensitive information. Most of the hardware Trojan detection techniques rely on a golden (trusted) IC against which to compare a suspected one. Hence they cannot be applied to designs using third party Intellectual Property (IP) cores where golden IP is unavailable. Moreover, due to the stealthy nature of hardware Trojan, there is no technique that can guarantee Trojan-free after manufacturing test. As a result, Trojan detection and recovery at run time acting as the last line of defense is necessary especially for mission-critical applications. In this paper, we propose design rules to assist run-time Trojan detection and fast recovery by exploring diversity of untrusted third party IP cores. With these design rules, we show the optimization approach to minimize the cost of implementation in terms of the number of different IP cores used by the implementation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":433816,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2014 51st ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)\",\"volume\":\"57 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"49\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2014 51st ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2593069.2593150\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2014 51st ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2593069.2593150","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 49

摘要

当前集成电路(IC)的发展过程中,对硬件木马的安全性提出了担忧,这些木马被恶意插入以改变功能行为或泄露敏感信息。大多数硬件木马检测技术依赖于黄金(可信)IC来比较可疑的IC。因此,它们不能应用于使用第三方知识产权(IP)核心的设计,因为黄金IP是不可用的。此外,由于硬件木马的隐蔽性,没有技术可以保证在制造测试后不受木马的影响。因此,运行时的木马检测和恢复作为最后一道防线是必要的,特别是对于任务关键型应用程序。在本文中,我们提出了设计规则,以协助运行时特洛伊木马检测和快速恢复通过探索不受信任的第三方IP核的多样性。通过这些设计规则,我们展示了根据实现使用的不同IP核的数量来最小化实现成本的优化方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
High-level synthesis for run-time hardware Trojan detection and recovery
Current Integrated Circuit (IC) development process raises security concerns about hardware Trojan which are maliciously inserted to alter functional behavior or leak sensitive information. Most of the hardware Trojan detection techniques rely on a golden (trusted) IC against which to compare a suspected one. Hence they cannot be applied to designs using third party Intellectual Property (IP) cores where golden IP is unavailable. Moreover, due to the stealthy nature of hardware Trojan, there is no technique that can guarantee Trojan-free after manufacturing test. As a result, Trojan detection and recovery at run time acting as the last line of defense is necessary especially for mission-critical applications. In this paper, we propose design rules to assist run-time Trojan detection and fast recovery by exploring diversity of untrusted third party IP cores. With these design rules, we show the optimization approach to minimize the cost of implementation in terms of the number of different IP cores used by the implementation.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信