基于非合作博弈和竞价模型的虚拟机资源分配

Jian Wan, D. Deng, Congfeng Jiang
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引用次数: 5

摘要

本文研究了虚拟化服务器的资源分配策略。基于非合作博弈理论,采用竞价模型解决了多实例竞争的虚拟化服务器资源分配问题。我们引入的效用函数的最优响应函数使得每个参与者的出价都是合理的。尽管效用函数在零点处没有定义,但我们证明了竞价博弈仍然有一个唯一的平衡点。在我们的模型中,资源被很好地分配到每个虚拟机中,提高了虚拟资源的利用率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Non-Cooperative Gaming and Bidding Model Based Resource Allocation in Virtual Machine Environment
In this paper, we study resource allocation strategy about the virtualized servers. Based on a non-cooperative game theory, we employ bidding model to solve the resource allocation problem in virtualized servers with multiple instances competing for resources. The optimal response function of utility function which we introduced makes every player bidding prices reasonable. Although utility function is not well-defined at the point of zero, we show that the bidding game still has a unique equilibrium point. In our model, recourses are well allocated to every virtual machine and the utilization of virtual resources is improved.
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