自然法则和因果力量:两种虚幻的解决方案

Sebastián Briceño
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引用次数: 0

摘要

休谟的先验形而上学受到了两个明确的反休谟的选择的攻击:Nomic Realism和positional essence。这些替代方案中的每一种都提供了一阶实例的实际分布的本体论解释。他们都声称,反对休谟,这种分布不是形而上学的偶然。在本文中,我认为他们提供的解释是虚幻的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
LEYES DE LA NATURALEZA Y PODERES CAUSALES: DOS SOLUCIONES ILUSORIAS
The metaphysics of Humean Supervenience has been attacked by two explicitly anti-Humean alternatives: Nomic Realism and Dispositional Essentialism. Each one of these alternatives offers an ontological explanation of the actual distribution of first-order instantiations. They both claim, against the Humean, that this distribution is not a metaphysical accident. In this paper, I argue that the explanations offered by them are illusory.
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