{"title":"自然法则和因果力量:两种虚幻的解决方案","authors":"Sebastián Briceño","doi":"10.4067/S0718-22012015000200007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The metaphysics of Humean Supervenience has been attacked by two explicitly anti-Humean alternatives: Nomic Realism and Dispositional Essentialism. Each one of these alternatives offers an ontological explanation of the actual distribution of first-order instantiations. They both claim, against the Humean, that this distribution is not a metaphysical accident. In this paper, I argue that the explanations offered by them are illusory.","PeriodicalId":354709,"journal":{"name":"Alpha (osorno)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"LEYES DE LA NATURALEZA Y PODERES CAUSALES: DOS SOLUCIONES ILUSORIAS\",\"authors\":\"Sebastián Briceño\",\"doi\":\"10.4067/S0718-22012015000200007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The metaphysics of Humean Supervenience has been attacked by two explicitly anti-Humean alternatives: Nomic Realism and Dispositional Essentialism. Each one of these alternatives offers an ontological explanation of the actual distribution of first-order instantiations. They both claim, against the Humean, that this distribution is not a metaphysical accident. In this paper, I argue that the explanations offered by them are illusory.\",\"PeriodicalId\":354709,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Alpha (osorno)\",\"volume\":\"46 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Alpha (osorno)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-22012015000200007\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Alpha (osorno)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-22012015000200007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
LEYES DE LA NATURALEZA Y PODERES CAUSALES: DOS SOLUCIONES ILUSORIAS
The metaphysics of Humean Supervenience has been attacked by two explicitly anti-Humean alternatives: Nomic Realism and Dispositional Essentialism. Each one of these alternatives offers an ontological explanation of the actual distribution of first-order instantiations. They both claim, against the Humean, that this distribution is not a metaphysical accident. In this paper, I argue that the explanations offered by them are illusory.