印度议会的议程控制及其对其监督职能的影响——分析与证据

M. Verma
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摘要

权力分立被理解为权力在政府不同部门之间的分散,每个部门都对另一个部门起制衡作用。这一原则被认为是极权主义的对立面,防止权力的绝对集中,从而保护自由。起源于英国的内阁式议会形式的政府,将行政和立法机关融合在一起。这导致了权力强大的行政部门和监管能力有限的立法机构被削弱。随着制度的发展,内部规则和程序也随着时间的推移而发展,通过分配议程控制的权力,它们既是行政主导的制约因素,也是推动因素。议程控制,被理解为决定议程内容的权力,是行政和立法机构之间有争议的概念。虽然已经有研究在美国国会和几个欧洲国家议会的背景下探讨议程控制,但在印度议会背景下的类似研究尚未出现。本文试图考察印度议会的规则和程序,以确定谁控制议程,以及这种控制对议会的监督职能产生了什么影响。为此目的,该文件将限于有关召开和延长会议、决定立法讨论的时间和议程以及控制对财政事项的审议的程序。本文最后对这些规则和程序的改革提出了一些建议,以确保在印度行政和立法机构之间更大程度地分享议程控制权。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Agenda Control in the Indian Parliament and the Impact on its Oversight Function – Analysis and Evidence
Separation of powers is understood as the diffusion of powers among different branches of the government, with each branch acting as a check on the other. This principle is considered an anti-thesis to totalitarianism, preventing the absolute concentration of power and thus protecting liberty. The Cabinet-style parliamentary form of government, with its genesis in Britain, fused together the executive with the legislature. This resulted in powerful executives and weakened legislatures with limited oversight capabilities. As institutions evolved over time, internal rules and procedures also evolved both as constraints and enablers of executive dominance, by distributing the powers of agenda control. Agenda control, understood as the power to decide what gets on the agenda, is a contested notion between the executive and the legislature. While there have been studies exploring agenda control in the context of the United States Congress and parliaments in several European countries, a similar study in the context of the Indian Parliament is yet to emerge. This paper attempts to examine the rules and procedures of the Indian Parliament to determine who controls the agenda, and what impact this control has on the oversight function of Parliament. For this purpose, the paper will limit itself to procedures pertaining to convening and proroguing a session, deciding the time and agenda for legislative discourse, and controlling deliberations on financial matters. The paper ends by making some recommendations on the reform of these rules and procedures, so as to ensure a greater sharing of the power of agenda control between the executive and the legislature in India.
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