网络上的集资游戏

ISRN Economics Pub Date : 2013-11-17 DOI:10.1155/2013/298595
A. Watts
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引用次数: 0

摘要

募捐者都知道,许多人只有在被要求的情况下才会向慈善机构或组织捐款,而且随着募捐者花更多的时间征求和/或研究潜在的捐赠者,大笔捐款更有可能发生。由于筹款人只能花时间与他们所知道的研究捐助者在一起,因此筹款人和捐助者之间的关系(或联系)非常重要。我们模拟了一个筹款游戏,在这个游戏中,筹款人只能邀请与他们有联系的捐赠者,并分析了这个网络如何影响捐赠请求。我们表明,如果这个网络是不完整的,如果捐赠者经历了极度的捐赠者疲劳,那么筹款人将花更多的时间来征求其他筹款人也有联系的捐赠者,而花更少的时间来征求他们唯一的筹款人。相反,如果捐赠者经历了轻微的捐赠者疲劳,那么筹款者更喜欢他们是唯一的筹款者,而不是与其他筹款者共享的捐赠者。如果捐赠者是没有捐赠者疲劳的潜在捐赠者,那么多重平衡可能存在。利用随机稳定性来细化这种情况下的均衡数目,并给出了唯一的随机稳定均衡有效的条件。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fund-Raising Games Played on a Network
It is well known among fund-raisers that many people contribute to charities or organizations only when asked and that large donations are more likely to occur as a fund-raiser increases the time spent soliciting and/or researching a potential donor. As fund-raisers can only spend time with research donors that they are aware of, the relationship (or links) between fund-raisers and donors is quite important. We model a fund-raising game where fund-raisers can only solicit donors whom they are tied to and analyze how this network influences donation requests. We show that if this network is incomplete and if donors experience extreme donor fatigue, then fund-raisers will spend more time soliciting donors that other fund-raisers are also tied to and less time soliciting donors that they are the only fund-raiser tied to. If instead donors experience mild donor fatigue, then fund-raisers prefer donors that they are the only fund-raiser tied to over donors that are shared with other fund-raisers. If donors are potential givers with no donor fatigue, then multiple equilibria may exist. Stochastic stability is used to refine the number of equilibria in this case, and conditions are given under which the unique stochastically stable equilibrium is efficient.
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