对国家的商品及服务税补偿:联盟不可避免的义务

Yash Sinha
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摘要

中央政府在2020年最初拒绝对各州在2020-21财年的商品及服务税收入中的实际和名义损失进行补偿。当不知所措的州政府争先恐后地为他们的要求寻找法律上和信托上的理由时,中心只是简单地引用了情况上的权宜之计和缺乏任何拒绝的义务。它提出了两种替代方案,即政府借债作为唯一的补偿机制。正如商品及服务税委员会的辩论和第101条宪法修正案共同揭示的那样,中心曾承诺相反。维持对各州补偿信贷的持续供应的义务源于这一承诺,鉴于各州作出的巨大牺牲,这一义务更具约束力。历史上独特的在附表七之外的立法税收领域的创造,以及中央在管理它们方面的压倒性优势,都是以未来对各州的考虑为前提的。第368(2)条的附带条款与其横向倒置的版本第252条具有相同的结果,因为它在“联邦市场”中运作的两个垂直政府分支机构之间制定了合同。因此,这预示了目前在美国宪法中普遍存在的“反强制”原则的基础。然后,商品及服务税补偿承诺成为宪法层面的合同义务,消除了中心原本可撤销的任何法律空间。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
GST Compensation to States: An Ineluctable Obligation on the Union
The Central Government in the year 2020 initially refused states a recompense for both actual and notional losses in their GST revenues for FY 2020-21. While the discombobulated state governments scrambled to find legal and fiduciary justification to their demands, the Center simply cited situational expediency and lack of any obligation for its denial. It suggested that two alternatives to the states, that involved them borrowing, as the only mechanism for compensation. As the GST Council debates and the 101st Constitutional Amendment Act would collectively reveal, the Center had promised to the contrary. The obligation of maintaining a constant supply of compensation-credit to states emanates from that promise and is all the more binding given the huge sacrifice made by the States. The historically unique creation of legislative tax-fields outside of the Schedule VII and the overwhelming dominance of the Center in administering them were both premised on this future consideration to the states. The proviso to Art. 368(2) has the same outcome as its laterally inverted version, Art. 252, insofar as it crafts a contract between two vertical government-branches operating in a ‘federal market’. This, then, adumbrates the foundation of what presently prevails in American Constitutional law as the ‘anti-coercion’ principle. The promise of GST compensation then becomes a contractual obligation at a Constitutional level, eliminating any legal space of revocability otherwise available to the Center.
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