应该忘记默认吗?负面消费者信用信息删除变化的证据

M. Bos, L. Nakamura
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引用次数: 24

摘要

实际上,所有工业化经济体都限制了信用机构保留借款人负面信用信息的时间长度。然而,各国允许的保留时间有很大差异。通过利用这种保留时间的准实验变化,我们研究了当负面信息较早地从信用文件中删除时会发生什么。我们发现,信息的丢失导致银行大幅收紧贷款标准,因为预期保留时间从平均三年半缩短到正好三年。与此同时,我们发现,还款时间较短的借款人违约的频率更高。尽管如此,由于借款人获得了更多的信贷净渠道,违约总额总体上没有增加,我们不能排除这种保留时间的减少是最优的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Should Defaults Be Forgotten? Evidence from Variation in Removal of Negative Consumer Credit Information
Practically all industrialized economies restrict the length of time that credit bureaus can retain borrowers’ negative credit information. There is, however, a large variation in the permitted retention times across countries. By exploiting a quasi-experimental variation in this retention time, we investigate what happens when negative information is deleted earlier from credit files. We find that the loss of information led banks to tighten their lending standards significantly as the expected retention time was diminished from on average three-and-a-half to three years exactly. Simultaneously, we find that borrowers who experience this shorter retention time default more frequently. Since borrowers nevertheless obtain more net access to credit and total defaults do not increase overall, we cannot rule out that this reduction in retention time is optimal.
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