银行营销策略中的互惠与承诺

S. Da Silva, Raul Matsushita, B. E. Santo, F. Sigrist
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引用次数: 1

摘要

银行与客户的关系建立在互惠而非承诺的基础上。这种情况产生了银行家的悖论,因为最需要钱的客户面临信贷风险,无法获得贷款。我们提出的调查证据表明,假装承诺的银行营销策略更成功,因为客户在进化过程中适应了理解承诺的优越性,并接受了承诺的暗示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Reciprocity vs. commitment in bank marketing strategies
The bank-client relationship is grounded on reciprocity rather than commitment. This circumstance generates the banker’s paradox as customers who need the money the most are at risk for credit and cannot obtain a loan. We present survey evidence that a bank marketing strategy pretending a commitment is more successful because clients are evolutionarily adapted to understand the superiority of commitment and be receptive to its cues.
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