单一制行政长官

S. Skowronek, John A. Dearborn, D. King
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章研究了统一行政机构的理论,以及它在特朗普总统任期内对抗深层国家幽灵的部署。该理论主张总统拥有所有行政权力,只有现任总统才是行政部门。他们的想法是,如果个人不能完全控制行政,就有可能混淆责任,使“人民”在下次选举中回顾总统表现的判断变得模糊。这种对宪法的解读常常与美国民主的全民公决概念联系在一起。本章讨论两个特别有趣的问题。第一种是对宪法的另一种“共和解读”,它期望在控制行政权力方面进行跨部门合作。二是作为单一制理论基础的宪法第二条授予条款与宪法最初制定以来发生了根本变化的选举程序之间的关系。本章最后指出,将对授予条款的广泛解读与当代的选择机制结合起来,对宪法意义造成了扭曲。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Unitary Executive
This chapter examines the theory of the unitary executive and its deployment in the Trump presidency afgainst the specter of a Deep State. The theory asserts that the president possesses all the executive power, that the incumbent alone is the executive branch. The idea is that anything less than complete control over administration by that individual risks an obfuscation of responsibility, clouding the judgments on presidential performance that “the people” get to deliver retrospectively in the next election. This reading of the Constitution is often joined to a strikingly plebiscitary conception of American democracy. This chapter takes up two issues of special interest. The first is an alternative “republican reading” of the Constitution which anticipates inter-branch collaboration in the control of administrative power. The second is the relationship between the vesting clause of Article II, on which the unitary theory is based, and the selection procedure, which has changed radically since its original constitutional formulation. The chapter concludes by pointing to the distortions of constitutional meaning introduced by joining an expansive reading of the vesting clause to contemporary selection mechanisms.
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