基于支持向量机的恶意环路检测

Zirak Allaf, M. Adda, A. Gegov
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引用次数: 2

摘要

现有的侧信道攻击技术,如熔毁攻击,表明攻击者可以利用微架构和操作系统漏洞来实现他们的目标。在本文中,我们介绍了我们的实时检测侧信道攻击系统的开发。与以前的工作不同,我们提出的检测系统不依赖于攻击者和受害者之间的同步。相反,它使用处理器的性能指标来捕获恶意的Flush+ Reload活动,准确率高达99%。此外,检测活动可以在本地和云系统中以最小的时间延迟实现,并且在主机系统中开销性能大约低于1%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Malicious Loop Detection Using Support Vector Machine
Existing Side-channel attack techniques, such as meltdown attacks, show that attackers can exploit the microarchitecture and OS vulnerabilities to achieve their goals. In this paper, we present the development of our real-time system for detecting side-channel attacks. Unlike previous works, our proposed detection system does not rely on synchronisation between the attackers and victims. Instead, it uses processors' performance indicators to capture malicious Flush+ Reload activities with an accuracy of up to 99%. Moreover, the detection activities can be achieved with minimum time delay in both native and cloud systems with a low overhead performance of approximately less than 1% in the host system.
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