Code integrity verification using cache memory monitoring

ABSTRACT This paper addresses the challenges of building a secure software system to prevent Man-at-the-End attacks. Ensuring the security of systems is challenging due to unfavorable constraints faced by the end-point host system. Constraints such as hostile environments leave the host system at the peril of would-be attackers. In this paper, we verify program integrity through L3 cache by monitoring the security-sensitive code points and verify them in memory. This paper uses a cache-based monitoring program to verify code integrity. In particular, we show that side-channel information can be used to encode the invariant of the program execution state. These invariants can be periodically and externally monitored as a proxy for application integrity. This monitoring system uses a sliding window scheme that can detect the violation of these invariant with high reliability. The proposed solution is transparent to the attacker and utilizes a side-channel technique (Flush + Reload) along with a sliding window scheme to monitor security-sensitive code and detect MATE attacks to prevent malicious manipulation of software.