{"title":"理性选择与行动理论","authors":"K. Dowding","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvkjb3vq.7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The chapter provides a simple introduction to rational choice theory as a method of analysis. It argues that the rationality assumptions provide consistency for agents, and then armed with that consistency the structural situations in which agents find themselves provides the explanation of their actions. Rational choice is thus a structural form of explanation. Many approaches to power are behaviorialist but behaviorialism is the comparison of human behaviour in different institutional or structural circumstances. It explains behaviorialism through a simple theory of action which proves important in the later analysis of why the collective action can answer many questions posed by power analysts. It examines the idea of non-decisions and explains how these arise in collective action through a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma game.","PeriodicalId":259292,"journal":{"name":"Rational Choice and Political Power","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Rational Choice and a Theory of Action\",\"authors\":\"K. Dowding\",\"doi\":\"10.2307/j.ctvkjb3vq.7\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The chapter provides a simple introduction to rational choice theory as a method of analysis. It argues that the rationality assumptions provide consistency for agents, and then armed with that consistency the structural situations in which agents find themselves provides the explanation of their actions. Rational choice is thus a structural form of explanation. Many approaches to power are behaviorialist but behaviorialism is the comparison of human behaviour in different institutional or structural circumstances. It explains behaviorialism through a simple theory of action which proves important in the later analysis of why the collective action can answer many questions posed by power analysts. It examines the idea of non-decisions and explains how these arise in collective action through a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma game.\",\"PeriodicalId\":259292,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Rational Choice and Political Power\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Rational Choice and Political Power\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvkjb3vq.7\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Rational Choice and Political Power","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvkjb3vq.7","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The chapter provides a simple introduction to rational choice theory as a method of analysis. It argues that the rationality assumptions provide consistency for agents, and then armed with that consistency the structural situations in which agents find themselves provides the explanation of their actions. Rational choice is thus a structural form of explanation. Many approaches to power are behaviorialist but behaviorialism is the comparison of human behaviour in different institutional or structural circumstances. It explains behaviorialism through a simple theory of action which proves important in the later analysis of why the collective action can answer many questions posed by power analysts. It examines the idea of non-decisions and explains how these arise in collective action through a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma game.