Fang:防火墙分析引擎

Alain J. Mayer, A. Wool, Elisha Ziskind
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引用次数: 324

摘要

如今,即使是中等规模的企业内部网也包含多个防火墙和路由器,它们都用于执行全球企业安全策略的各个方面。将这些设备配置为一致工作是很困难的,特别是如果它们是由不同的供应商生产的。甚至对现有配置进行测试或逆向工程(比如当新的安全管理员接管时)都很困难。防火墙配置文件以低级形式编写,其可读性与汇编代码相当,并且全局策略分布在涉及的所有防火墙中。为了减轻这些困难,我们设计并实现了一个新的防火墙分析工具。我们的软件允许管理员轻松地发现和测试全局防火墙策略(部署的策略或计划的策略)。我们的工具使用最少的网络拓扑描述,并直接解析各种特定于供应商的低级配置文件。它通过查询和回答会话与用户交互,这是在更高层次的抽象上进行的。我们的工具可以回答的一个典型问题是“可以从哪些机器访问我们的DMZ以及使用哪些服务?”因此,该工具补充了现有的漏洞分析工具,因为它可以在实际部署策略之前使用,它在一个更容易理解的抽象级别上操作,并且它一次处理所有的防火墙。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fang: a firewall analysis engine
Today, even a moderately sized corporate intranet contains multiple firewalls and routers, which are all used to enforce various aspects of the global corporate security policy. Configuring these devices to work in unison is difficult, especially if they are made by different vendors. Even testing or reverse engineering an existing configuration (say when a new security administrator takes over) is hard. Firewall configuration files are written in low level formalisms, whose readability is comparable to assembly code, and the global policy is spread over all the firewalls that are involved. To alleviate some of these difficulties, we designed and implemented a novel firewall analysis tool. Our software allows the administrator to easily discover and test the global firewall policy (either a deployed policy or a planned one). Our tool uses a minimal description of the network topology and directly parses the various vendor-specific low level configuration files. It interacts with the user through a query-and-answer session, which is conducted at a much higher level of abstruction. A typical question our tool can answer is "from which machines can our DMZ be reached and with which services?" Thus, the tool complements existing vulnerability analysis tools, as it can be used before a policy is actually deployed it operates on a more understandable level of abstraction, and it deals with all the firewalls at once.
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