{"title":"邪恶的思想","authors":"G. Sher","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197564677.003.0004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"According to many virtue ethicists, a wrong act is one that a virtuous person would not perform. Because most virtues involve dispositions to feel and think as well as act, a natural extension of this claim may appear to support the conclusion that it is morally wrong to have vicious thoughts. However, because moral reasons are widely thought to be very strong if not overriding, any such argument must be backed by an explanation of how a thought’s viciousness can give us a suitably strong reason not to have it. This chapter examines the two most promising theories of virtue and vice, eudaemonism and Platonism, and concludes that neither provides the needed explanation.","PeriodicalId":382434,"journal":{"name":"A Wild West of the Mind","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Vicious Thoughts\",\"authors\":\"G. Sher\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780197564677.003.0004\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"According to many virtue ethicists, a wrong act is one that a virtuous person would not perform. Because most virtues involve dispositions to feel and think as well as act, a natural extension of this claim may appear to support the conclusion that it is morally wrong to have vicious thoughts. However, because moral reasons are widely thought to be very strong if not overriding, any such argument must be backed by an explanation of how a thought’s viciousness can give us a suitably strong reason not to have it. This chapter examines the two most promising theories of virtue and vice, eudaemonism and Platonism, and concludes that neither provides the needed explanation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":382434,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"A Wild West of the Mind\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"A Wild West of the Mind\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197564677.003.0004\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"A Wild West of the Mind","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197564677.003.0004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
According to many virtue ethicists, a wrong act is one that a virtuous person would not perform. Because most virtues involve dispositions to feel and think as well as act, a natural extension of this claim may appear to support the conclusion that it is morally wrong to have vicious thoughts. However, because moral reasons are widely thought to be very strong if not overriding, any such argument must be backed by an explanation of how a thought’s viciousness can give us a suitably strong reason not to have it. This chapter examines the two most promising theories of virtue and vice, eudaemonism and Platonism, and concludes that neither provides the needed explanation.
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