支付辞职和团队激励

ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-09-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.2863123

Pak Hung Au

{"title":"支付辞职和团队激励","authors":"Pak Hung Au","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2863123","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n This paper examines the optimal compensation scheme, job design, and severance policy for a team using a model of repeated moral hazard. In the optimal contract, the agent may be paid to quit after a poor performance. We show that a generous severance policy facilitates the adoption of team incentives and team-based production by making it cost-effective to implement peer monitoring and sanction among the agents.","PeriodicalId":372415,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"47 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Pay to Quit and Team Incentives\",\"authors\":\"Pak Hung Au\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2863123\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n This paper examines the optimal compensation scheme, job design, and severance policy for a team using a model of repeated moral hazard. In the optimal contract, the agent may be paid to quit after a poor performance. We show that a generous severance policy facilitates the adoption of team incentives and team-based production by making it cost-effective to implement peer monitoring and sanction among the agents.\",\"PeriodicalId\":372415,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"47 6 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2863123\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2863123","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

摘要

本文利用重复道德风险模型研究了团队的最优薪酬方案、岗位设计和离职政策。在最优契约中，代理在表现不佳后可能会得到报酬而退出。我们的研究表明，慷慨的离职政策通过使代理人之间实施同伴监督和制裁具有成本效益，促进了团队激励和团队生产的采用。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Pay to Quit and Team Incentives

This paper examines the optimal compensation scheme, job design, and severance policy for a team using a model of repeated moral hazard. In the optimal contract, the agent may be paid to quit after a poor performance. We show that a generous severance policy facilitates the adoption of team incentives and team-based production by making it cost-effective to implement peer monitoring and sanction among the agents.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

ERN: Employee Motivation & Incentives (Topic)

自引率

0.00%

发文量