另类投资绩效费安排及其对证券交易委员会监管政策的影响:评论

The Bell Journal of Economics Pub Date : 1900-01-01 DOI:10.2307/3003284

William Margrabe

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引用次数: 12

摘要

根据莫迪利亚尼和波格在他们最近的文章中提出的假设，这篇评论解释了为什么投资组合经理没有动力选择他们的计划1费用而不是计划2费用，论证了为什么投资组合经理和投资公司是多余的，并反驳了作者在不受监管的资本市场中对投资组合经理行为的过度悲观结论。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Alternative Investment Performance Fee Arrangements and Implications for SEC Regulatory Policy: Comment

Working from the assumptions that Modigliani and Pogue made in their recent article, this comment explains why there is no incentive for a portfolio manager to prefer their Plan 1 fee over their Plan 2 fee, demonstrates why the portfolio manager and investment company are superfluous, and rebuts the authors' unduly pessimistic conclusions about portfolio manager behavior in an unregulated capital market.

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来源期刊

The Bell Journal of Economics

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