能力方法与马克思主义对政治正义概念的解释。对乌克兰战后复辟的反思

V. Khoma
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引用次数: 0

摘要

马克思主义作为一种规范立场是对自由主义的批判。然而,马克思主义所关注的正义与异化问题,可以在不实施马克思主义政治方案的情况下,由自由主义来解决。本文的目的是证实玛莎·努斯鲍姆的能力方法(政治自由主义的一种版本)是一种比马克思主义更包容、更合理的正义基本原则理论化方法。通过分析伊丽莎白·安德森的自由平等主义“民主平等”理论,我表明,一些马克思主义的方法(1)不否认正义的存在,(2)关注异化问题,可以运用政治自由主义道德理论的武器库来解决这些问题。我也批评罗尔斯和努斯鲍姆的政治自由主义理论,因为它们的程序模糊性和非包容性的正义理论。我提出了我的立场的大纲,我建议称之为“扩展的政治自由主义”(以下简称EPL)。EPL目前有两种观点:1)paideia观点和2)善与权相互依存的观点。第一,只有当公民意识到基本权利和自由,并有机会改变他们对个人善的概念的看法时,才能谈论基本权利和自由的实际执行。没有高质量的基础教育,这是不可能的。此外,EPL的核心概念之一是在Paideia论证的框架内提出的-对正义的政治概念的解释。正因如此,我们才有必要探讨公民反思当前政治观念与个人善观调和的可能性。这也可以通过分析其他善的概念来实现。第二个论点是第一个论点的延续,作为一种理论机制出现,允许在严重的社会变化情况下补充现有的政治概念。总之,如果我们考虑到能力理论的优点和我对其缺点的批评,那么一个理论立场就会出现,这是一些马克思主义代表所能接受的。此外,后者将不必放弃他们的基本信仰。我在本文中提出的概念的特点在于,与其说它是对马克思主义的批判,不如说是对政治自由主义基本规范判断的分析,这是一些马克思主义者可以同意的。在这篇文章中,我还想说明这样一个概念的优势,并指出它对进一步尝试通过其他规范立场解释政治概念的前景。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Capabilities approach and the marxist interpretation of the political conception of justice. reflections on the after-war restoration of Ukraine
Marxism as a normative position is critical of liberalism. However, the problems of justice and alienation that Marxism draws attention to can be solved by liberalism without the implementation of a Marxist political project. The purpose of the article is to substantiate the thesis that Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach (one of the versions of political liberalism) is a more inclusive and rational method of theorizing about the basic principles of justice than Marxism. By analyzing Elizabeth Anderson's theory of liberal egalitarianism "democratic equality", I show that some of Marxist approaches that (1) do not deny the existence of justice and (2) are concerned with the problem of alienation, can apply the arsenal of the moral theory of political liberalism to solve these problems. I also criticize Rawls's and Nussbaum's theories of political liberalism for their procedural vagueness and non-inclusive theory of justice. I present an outline of my position, which I propose to call «extended political liberalism» (hereafter EPL). EPL is currently represented by two arguments: 1) the paideia argument and 2) the argument of the interdependence of the good and the right. The first allows talking about the actual implementation of basic rights and freedoms only when citizens are aware of them and have the opportunity to change their views regarding the personal conception of the good. This is impossible without qualitative basic education. Also, one of the central concepts of EPL is presented within the framework of Paideia's argument - the interpretation of the political conception of justice. Because of this concept, it makes sense to talk about the possibility of citizens' reflection on the reconciliation of the current political conception with the personal conception of the good. This can also be done through the analysis of other conceptions of the good. The second argument is a continuation of the first, appearing as a theoretical mechanism that allows supplementing the existing political conception in case of serious social changes. In conclusion, if we take into account the advantages of the capabilities approach and my criticism of its weaknesses, then a theoretical position will emerge that is quite acceptable to some representatives of Marxism. Moreover, the latter will not have to give up their basic beliefs. The peculiarity of my concept presented in this text is that it is not so much a critique of Marxism as an analysis of the basic normative judgments of political liberalism, with which some Marxists can agree. With this article, I also want to illustrate the strengths of such a concept and point to its prospects for further attempts to interpret the political conception by other normative positions.
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