区块链持有者可以挖掘多少价值?来自保加利亚大规模私有化拍卖的证据

V. Atanasov
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引用次数: 131

摘要

本研究考察了保加利亚股票市场的出现和控制大股东的作用。一种利用大规模私有化拍卖数据衡量控制权溢价的新方法表明,在没有法律约束的情况下,多数所有者提取了85%以上的公司价值作为控制权的私人利益。机构投资者形成主要控制头寸的投资组合或参与多数联盟。持股比例集中在51%。私有化后的公司开始在保加利亚证券交易所交易,多数股权公司以40-60%的折扣交易。总体而言,研究结果支持Fama和Jensen(1983)的观点,即如果控股股东的征用行为没有受到法律限制,多数股权公司就无法作为上市公司持续存在。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How Much Value Can Blockholders Tunnel? Evidence from the Bulgarian Mass Privatization Auctions
This study examines the emergence of the Bulgarian stock market and the role of controlling blockholders. A new approach using mass privatization auction data measures the premium for control and demonstrates that, in the absence of legal constraints, majority owners extract more than 85% of firm value as private benefits of control. Institutional investors form portfolios of predominantly controlling positions or participate in majority coalitions. Ownership stakes cluster at 51%. After the privatized companies begin trading on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, majority-owned firms trade at 40-60% discounts. Overall, the results support the Fama and Jensen (1983) view that majority-owned firms cannot persist as publicly traded corporations if the expropriating activities of controlling blockholders are not legally restricted.
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