{"title":"区块链持有者可以挖掘多少价值?来自保加利亚大规模私有化拍卖的证据","authors":"V. Atanasov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.283601","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the emergence of the Bulgarian stock market and the role of controlling blockholders. A new approach using mass privatization auction data measures the premium for control and demonstrates that, in the absence of legal constraints, majority owners extract more than 85% of firm value as private benefits of control. Institutional investors form portfolios of predominantly controlling positions or participate in majority coalitions. Ownership stakes cluster at 51%. After the privatized companies begin trading on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, majority-owned firms trade at 40-60% discounts. Overall, the results support the Fama and Jensen (1983) view that majority-owned firms cannot persist as publicly traded corporations if the expropriating activities of controlling blockholders are not legally restricted.","PeriodicalId":409578,"journal":{"name":"Tuck Contemporary Corporate Governance Issues","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"131","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How Much Value Can Blockholders Tunnel? Evidence from the Bulgarian Mass Privatization Auctions\",\"authors\":\"V. Atanasov\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.283601\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This study examines the emergence of the Bulgarian stock market and the role of controlling blockholders. A new approach using mass privatization auction data measures the premium for control and demonstrates that, in the absence of legal constraints, majority owners extract more than 85% of firm value as private benefits of control. Institutional investors form portfolios of predominantly controlling positions or participate in majority coalitions. Ownership stakes cluster at 51%. After the privatized companies begin trading on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, majority-owned firms trade at 40-60% discounts. Overall, the results support the Fama and Jensen (1983) view that majority-owned firms cannot persist as publicly traded corporations if the expropriating activities of controlling blockholders are not legally restricted.\",\"PeriodicalId\":409578,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Tuck Contemporary Corporate Governance Issues\",\"volume\":\"6 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-04-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"131\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Tuck Contemporary Corporate Governance Issues\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.283601\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Tuck Contemporary Corporate Governance Issues","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.283601","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
How Much Value Can Blockholders Tunnel? Evidence from the Bulgarian Mass Privatization Auctions
This study examines the emergence of the Bulgarian stock market and the role of controlling blockholders. A new approach using mass privatization auction data measures the premium for control and demonstrates that, in the absence of legal constraints, majority owners extract more than 85% of firm value as private benefits of control. Institutional investors form portfolios of predominantly controlling positions or participate in majority coalitions. Ownership stakes cluster at 51%. After the privatized companies begin trading on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, majority-owned firms trade at 40-60% discounts. Overall, the results support the Fama and Jensen (1983) view that majority-owned firms cannot persist as publicly traded corporations if the expropriating activities of controlling blockholders are not legally restricted.